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February 01, 2010

Thank You, Jonathan Chait

Political scientists believe unanimously that economic conditions play an important role in shaping public opinion. I don’t think you could find one who would suggest that a president one year into his term facing double-digit unemployment could avoid a significant drop in popularity.

One complaint I have with the mainstream media is its habit of ignoring such structural factors and explaining changes in public opinion almost solely as the outcome of ideological positioning by candidates and elected officials. In defense of the MSM, they do this in a bipartisan way. Whenever a party suffers electoral misfortune, the media will attribute it to a failure to heed to wishes of the center, coupled with demands that the losing party purge itself of ideological sin and embrace the moderate center.

The rest of the piece is an argument with a former aide to Karl Rove. For the purposes of this blog, I’m just happy to see political science get its due. Chait also notes that he did not over-intepret the 2008 election as a sweeping mandate, for which he deserves credit.

[Hat tip to Brendan Nyhan.]

January 29, 2010

Gail Collins Needs Some New Material

otter.jpg

Gail Collins on the Democracts, April 2009:

…getting all 60 Democrats-and-fellow-travelers to vote together on something will be like herding…rabid guinea pigs in a thunderstorm, maybe.

Gail Collins on the Republicans, January 2010:

Have you ever seen all the House Republicans in one place? It’s like a herd of rabid otters.

Maybe, in the confusion of the thunderstorm, the rabid guinea pigs bit the otters.

January 16, 2010

Hubris, Development, and David Brooks

I’m slightly terrified now that Bill Clinton, special envoy to Haiti, has said David Brooks is his leading intellectual light.

That is Chris Blattman, concluding a tidy little response to this David Brook piece.

I also thought this was interesting, especially in light of my darts this week at Maureen Dowd:

Don’t misunderstand me: Brooks could be right. In fact, I’m starting one randomized control trial to test the idea. I’m a little further from propounding it as God’s honest truth on the pages of the Times.

Can you be a good op-ed columnist and still admit uncertainty? The answer has to be yes. I await proof, however.

December 04, 2009

Expert Opinion on the (Lack of) Watchers of Cable News

Reading John’s post earlier this week flagging Ezra Klein’s post on what Politico fears, I was particularly struck by Klein’s claim that pretty much no one watches cable news, which in turn was based on this post at Mother Jones (and also commented upon by Jonathan Bernstein here). In response, I posed the following question to my former colleague Markus Prior, the author of Post-Broadcast Democracy

When people say that cable news audiences are only in the hundreds of thousands, does that mean the same hundred of thousands? Or are lots of people watching infrequently?

Markus’s response was as follows:

We don’t know for sure how the average audiences add up over the course of a day or a week because cume audiences are rarely reported by Nielsen. But it’s a good guess that concentration is pretty heavy.

Either way, it is a mistake to argue that cable news viewing is only a minor fraction of overall news consumption:

It is widely believed that Americans as a whole also watch less news than in the past. This belief is based on a flawed interpretation of the available data. Central to the misinterpretation is the impression that a 38 rating for the three evening network news programs—the highest-ever combined yearly average—is more news than an average 1.4 rating for the three major cable networks (CNN, Fox News Channel, and MSNBC)—their 2004 combined average. It is not. The 38 rating means that on a typical weekday in 1980, 38 percent of all U.S. households watched one of the three evening network newscasts—thirty minutes of news (including commercial breaks). For the average household, this amounts to 11.4 minutes (30 minutes ´ .38) of news per weekday. A 1.4 rating for the three cable networks means that 1.4 percent of all U.S. households watched one of the three cable networks during the average minute of the day. For the average household, this amounts to 20.2 minutes (60 minutes ´ 24 hours ´ .014) of news per day. (Prior, Post-Broadcast Democracy, p. 151)

Even if cable news accounts for more news consumption than the three network newscasts, this doesn’t mean that cable reaches many “persuadable voters.” Glenn Beck’s audience was conservative before he became the lasted cable sensation. Rachel Maddow preaches to viewers who were liberal before she got her show

No need to argue, then, that cable news isn’t good at what it’s doing—making money by entertaining a few million partisans every day. But it’s not changing American politics as we know it.

December 01, 2009

What Politico Fears

What Politico — and other campaign-obsessed outlets — fear are the narratives that expose much of their work as simple distractions. What they fear, I think, is political science.

That is Ezra Klein. His entire post is worth reading. He saved me from writing nearly the same thing.

November 17, 2009

The News Diet of Richard M. Nixon


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This study examines the media diet of Richard Nixon, whose exposure to the news consisted almost entirely of a White House-produced daily news summary. Nixon staffers repeatedly asserted that the summary was the most effective way to give the president a comprehensive, objective account of the previous day’s reporting. While the summaries covered a wide range of media sources, analysis of the framing and filtering done by the White House raises doubts about the assertion that summaries were an effective substitute for first-hand consumption of the news. Nixon’s handwritten marginal notes reveal that the summaries provoked reactions in the president that had important implications for his conduct of the presidency.

That’s from some newly published research by Chris Karpowitz. Nixon’s marginal notes are of course full of tasty tidbits:

Get out that I missed both games on Sunday (Jan. 2). I never allow T.V. to interfere with state business.

H[aldeman] – who in the hell would be so stupid to put this out – It absolutely serves no purpose whatever except to blow our low key method & give CBS a scoop – Stop filling in the staff on avg political tactics.

H – See that N.B.C. gets a hard kick from Klein on this.

More generally, Karpowitz finds that Nixon’s news summaries emphasized negative depictions of Nixon and thereby fed his distrust:

At the same time, though, the summaries were the kindling that could fire the more negative aspects of Nixon’s personality. From that perspective, they were an extremely poor fit with his personality. Instead of countering his destructive tendencies, the summaries consistently reinforced already existing resentments.

It’s no surprise, then, that the plurality of his marginal comments were either spin (as in the first comment above) or venting (as in the second and third).

Karpowitz concludes:

For healthy presidential leadership, there may be no substitute for first-hand consumption of media stories, even if in managed doses.

October 27, 2009

The Political Science of #CNNfail

The New York Times reports on CNN’s travails.

CNN, which invented the cable news network more than two decades ago, will hit a new competitive low with its prime-time programs in October, finishing fourth – and last – among the cable news networks with the audience that all the networks rely on for their advertising. The official monthly numbers will be finalized at 4 p.m. Monday and will include results from Friday. CNN executives conceded that will not change the competitive standing for the month. CNN will still be last in prime time. That means CNN’s programs were behind not only Fox News and MSNBC, but even its own sister network HLN (formerly Headline News.) That was the first time CNN had finished that poorly with its prime-time shows. The results demonstrate once more the apparent preference of viewers for opinion-oriented shows from the news networks in prime time. CNN has steered opinion hosts like Nancy Grace to HLN, while maintaining more news-oriented shows on CNN itself. When news events are not being intensely followed, CNN executives acknowledge, viewers seem to be looking for partisan views more than objective coverage. (my emphasis)

Not having followed this over time, I don’t want to make too much of it. However, it is very tempting indeed to analyze CNN’s troubles in the light of Markus Prior’s arguments in Post-Broadcast Democracy. Briefly, Prior argues that cable has dramatically expanded viewers’ choices with two important consequences for media consumption. First - differences emerge between those who are interested in politics and those who are not. When there were three major broadcast networks, those who weren’t very interested in politics had little choice but to absorb some political knowledge indirectly as they waited for the sports scores. Now, they can just watch ESPN exclusively instead. Second, those who remain interested in consuming political media have a very different profile from the body of viewers before. Those who are not very interested in politics have a much greater tendency to be moderate. Those who are intensely interested in politics tend to be highly partisan. Now that the politically apathetic are dropping out of consuming political news, those who remain tend to be highly partisan - and much more interested in consuming Sean Hannity or Rachel Maddow (not that I want to equate these two except in more than a generic way) than in consuming bland, centrist pabulum. This all suggests that CNN finds itself in a very tough spot. NB that I am not sure that this provides a complete explanation or a correct one (one NYT story does not a dataset make), but it at the least seems highly plausible to me (and hence, good enough for blogging).

October 01, 2009

The Fox and the President

My colleague Pat Egan sends along the following comments:

The Obama presidency has been very good for Fox News. As shown in the figure below, ratings for the right-skewing news network climbed throughout the summer and have now reached levels equivalent to a peak last seen during the 2008 presidential campaign. For CNN and MSNBC, it’s a different story. Once their combined viewership matched that of Fox on a consistent basis, but over the past few months the two nets have sputtered while Fox has soared.

News_Ratings.jpg

Less clear than the trends themselves, however, is whether this helps or hurts Republicans in a general sense. Undoubtedly big ratings for Fox are a sign of increased interest in politics among conservatives. But it may also signal trouble for Republican politicians like Chuck Grassley and Kay Bailey Hutchison, who are having trouble being seen as conservative enough to suit the tastes of a newly energized right wing.

Makes me wonder if Fox news is actually more entertaining when Republicans are in the opposition - after all, it’s usually more fun to watch your favorite team on offense than on defense…

[Hat tip to TV by the Numbers for the Figure]

September 29, 2009

You Can Be a Washington Post Pundit

Here’s your chance to put your opinions to the test — and win the opportunity to write a weekly column and a launching pad for your opinionating career!

Use the entry form to send us a short opinion essay (400 words or less) pegged to a topic in the news and an additional paragraph (100 words or less) on yourself and why you should win. Entries will be judged on the basis of style, intelligence and freshness of argument, but not on whether Post editors agree or disagree with your point of view. Entry deadline: Oct. 21, 2009 at 11:59 p.m. ET.

Beginning on or about Oct. 30, ten prospective pundits will get to compete for the title of America’s Next Great Pundit, facing off in challenges that test the skills a modern pundit must possess. They’ll have to write on deadline, hold their own on video and field questions from Post readers. (Contestants won’t have to quit their day jobs, but they should be prepared to put in about eight hours a week for three weeks.) After each round, a panel of Post personalities will offer kudos and catcalls, and reader votes will help to determine who gets another chance at a byline and who has to shut down their laptop.

More is here. Whatever snark I could muster about this is outweighed by my very sincere hope that a few political scientists will apply. And if a political scientist wins, drinks are on me.

September 22, 2009

Are There Academic Studies on Media Overexposure?

As a quick follow up to John’s post, the discussion today at Politico’s Arena is also on the topic of Obama’s recent media blitz. One of the questions that has come up in the media once again since Sunday is whether Obama is overexposed (see here, here; and here). With all this discussion, I was wondering whether there was any political science research on the topic. Has anyone ever done a study linking frequency of a chief executive’s media exposure to, for example, public approval of that executive and/or legislative success in particular policy areas?

August 31, 2009

Why does the press cover the horse race, not policies?

John’s recent blog inspires me to resurrect this note of mine from a couple years ago:

Continue reading "Why does the press cover the horse race, not policies?" »

Horse Race Journalism, Redux

Paul Krugman and Matt Yglesias respond to the Washington Post’s ombudman’s finding that their coverage of health care reform has focused on strategy rather than policy consequences. Krugman suggests some reasons why it’s easier and safer for journalists to write on strategy. Yglesias adds this:

After all, the vast majority of people in this day and age don’t watch cable news channels and don’t read newspaper articles about American politics. The minority of the population that does do those things presumably consists of people who find coverage done the way it’s done to be pretty interesting. If you changed it all around to focus more on things like “what does this mean for average people?” or “what sorts of people would be impacted by this bill and how?” and less on things like “what tactics are Republicans using?” or “was it a mistake for Obama to emphasize cost control?” then you’re running a good chance of alienating the audience you have, and just kind of hoping that the people who are currently tuned out would tune in.

Some research suggests that he is right. In this post, I summarized a nice study by Iyengar, Norpoth, and Kahn. In the fall of 2000, they sent subjects a CD-ROM with campaign stories from the 2000 race and then tracked the attention they paid to different categories of studies. They found:

Given access to a wide variety of news reports about the presidential campaign during the weeks immediately preceding the 2000 election, we find that voters were drawn to reports on the horse race and strategy. Strategy reports proved especially popular among readers with higher levels of political engagement.

In short, the actual audience for news wants to hear more about strategy. Why? Probably because they already know what candidate or, in this case, policy they favor — at least in broad terms (e.g., yea or nay on health care reform) — and so they want to know whether their preferred policy is “winning.” That’s what strategy coverage provides them.

August 13, 2009

Is the Supreme Court Conservative or Liberal? It Depends on Whether You Read the Paper

Scholars of the Supreme Court confront a puzzle: why do conservatives in the public like Supreme Court less than liberals, even though the contemporary Court leans conservative? One answer is that attitudes toward the Court are “lagging” behind these changes in the Court’s composition. In short, people still have the well-known decisions of the more liberal Warren Court in mind when they think about the contemporary Court. See this piece by Marc Hetherington and Joseph Smith.

My colleague Brandon Bartels and his co-author Christopher Johnson have a different answer. They find that although the Court’s decisions under, say, Rehnquist, were more conservative than its decisions under Warren, that’s not reflected in the cases that get lots of media coverage.

A simple way to show this is to ask whether a particular Court decision was on the front page of the New York Times the day after the decision was announced. Call these “salient” cases, knowing that they were likely covered in many other media as well.

When Bartels and Johnson looked at civil liberties and civil rights cases and then broke them down by salience, they found that the “salient” cases were more liberal than the “non-salient cases.” Here is the graph:

bartelsjohnson.PNG

This helps explain why conservatives like the Court less than liberals, but in a different way. It’s not that the public hasn’t “caught up” with the Court, it’s that they are hearing and learning more about the Court’s liberal decisions than its conservative decisions.

August 08, 2009

The poor, shrinking Washington Post

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The Washington Post, like many other newspapers, has fallen on hard times. The only part of the Post empire that’s making any money is the Stanley Kaplan test preparation operation, while the Post itself is bleeding millions. As a consequence, the paper has eliminated a lot of what used to be its most appealing features and has pensioned off many of its best reporters and writers. In recent months, too, the leaders of the paper have embarrassed themselves and have sullied the paper’s reputation with a series of stupid lapses of judgment and taste that never would have happened under the old Post regime. The paper is shrinking in size, in ambition, in quality, in editorial standards, in reputation — in every way that matters.

All this has been obvious to those of use who live with the Post on an everyday basis. It has come as something of a shock, though, to an otherwise-close observer of the media who has been away for a while and is now reacclimating to life Stateside. As James Fallows, just returned from a stint in China, writes:

The NYT, for all its travails, is a recognizable version of the publication I’d previously known. Personality, depth, world-view, tone. The poor Washington Post is not. Laying off — that is, buying out — so many reporters who knew so much about their topics has had a more profound effect than I would have guessed. …And the resulting paper seems more obviously desperate to try anything that will draw attention in this new age. …I’ve thought of the Post as my hometown paper for years and feel as if I’ve come back to see a family member looking suddenly very ill. …If someone asked, what do you notice that’s changed, the Post would be high on the list.

August 04, 2009

The folly of paradox . . . and yet another explanation for the decline of newspapers, this time based on cognitive psychology

I was in DC for a conference and picked up the Washington Post. When I got to the op-ed page, I noticed a column, The Folly of Hate-Crime Laws, by Richard Cohen, which reminded me of why I drastically cut back on my consumption of newspaper op-eds a couple of decades ago.

The column as a whole is reasonable enough, if commonplace—Cohen is making the argument that there’s no reason to specially punish hate crimes, it should be enough to punish the crime itself. I have no problem with this argument (and do not pretend to have the legal knowledge to evaluate it). But I do have a problem with Cohen’s conclusion, which is that charging James von Brunn (the guy who recently shot up somebody at the Holocaust Museum) with a hate crime “ghettoizes both its real and purported victims. It’s a consequence that von Brunn himself might applaud.”

Huh? Maybe it’s time for a jailhouse interview. Cohen is a reporter, right? Short of that, I’d say it’s safe to assume that, no, von Brunn would not “applaud” hate crimes laws. The burden of proof is on whoever would claim differently, no?

I think the problem with this sort of column is that the columnist typically has to choose between a few options: (a) moral indignation, (b) bemused detachment, © a delightfully paradoxical twist, . . . Cohen went for ©. But, as we all know, it’s easier to be counterintuitive and wrong than counterintuitive and right.

As Cohen puts it, “Slippery slopes are supposedly all around us, I know, but this one is the real McCoy.”

Connection to loss aversion

I actually remember Richard Cohen’s name from when I was reading the Post thirty years ago. Maybe it’s time for him to retire. But I can see how this might not happen. If you yank Cohen and replace him with somebody new, you’ll make some readers happy and antagonize others. But, loss aversion being what it is, it’s likely that the negative reader reaction would outweigh the positive. So he stays in.

August 03, 2009

How conservative is Michelle Malkin, part 2

Following Paul Krugman, John Sides considers how one might measure the ideological position of conservative political commentator Michelle Malkin. I’d heard the name but I don’t have any TV reception and didn’t really know what she stood for. Going to her webpage, I see she’s written three books: “Invasion: How America Still Welcomes Terrorists, Criminals, and Other Foreign Menaces to Our Shores,” “In Defense of Internment: The Case for ‘Racial Profiling’ in World War II and the War on Terror,” and “Unhinged: Exposing Liberals Gone Wild.” From her blog, she also appears to have conservative economic views, although it’s hard to separate this from partisanship without going back to posts from previous years.

Krugman wants a “scale of positions on political matters … we might find that only 19 percent of Americans are to the right of Michelle Malkin, while 23 percent are to the left of Michael Moore.” I don’t have enough of a sense about Malkin, but I’m pretty sure that much less than 23% of Americans are to the left of Michael Moore. In chapter 8 of Red State, Blue State is this graph from Joe Bafumi and Michael Herron estimating the ideological positions of congressmembers and voters:

Continue reading "How conservative is Michelle Malkin, part 2" »

How Conservative is Michelle Malkin?

Paul Krugman asks about locating Michelle Malkin on the ideological spectrum:

When I saw that Michelle Malkin will be on the Stephanopoulos panel this week, my first thought was that nobody as far to the left as she is to the right would ever appear on such a panel. But then I started to wonder (a) what I mean by that (b) if it’s true. I don’t want to be like Bill O’Reilly, who considers anyone he disagrees with a “far-left” activist. So we need some objective metric. The most natural would seem to be voter opinion: what fraction of the American public is to Malkin’s right? … What I’d like to have is a Guttman scale of positions on political matters … we might find that only 19 percent of Americans are to the right of Michelle Malkin, while 23 percent are to the left of Michael Moore. … if there are any such data available, I don’t know about them.

This is a difficult question, but here are three possible strategies for answering it:

Continue reading "How Conservative is Michelle Malkin?" »

July 06, 2009

Twitter, Web 2.0, and Protest: China Edition

Following up on the many previous Monkey Cage posts on the use of Twitter and other Web 2.0 tools in recent protests in Iran (see here, here, and here) and elsewhere, it is worth noting that the BBC is reporting that one of China’s first steps in addressing the protests and violence in Xinjiang province has apparently been to curtail internet access. The BBC writes on its web site:

BBC sources in China report they have been unable to open the Twitter messaging site in Shanghai and that message boards on Xinjiang on a number of websites were not taking posts.

Reports from Xinjiang suggest some internet and mobile phone services have been blocked.

Analysts say the government’s so-called Great Firewall of China, which it uses to block unwanted internet material, will prevent large-scale dissemination of information but that dedicated internet users can bypass it fairly easily.

June 30, 2009

Documentary on Katz and Lazarsfeld's Personal Influence

Drawing from more than 25 hours of oral history interviews, Dr. Glenda Balas of the University of New Mexico has written and produced “The Long Road to Decatur: A History of Personal Influence.”

The video documentary chronicles the development of the classic (and controversial) book Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications, first published in 1955.

The webpage of the documentary, with a video file to download, is here. I haven’t yet watched the video. The book is still in print. Here is a critique of how the book’s findings have been interpreted.

[Hat tip to Doug Hess.]

UPDATE: Here is a summary of a 2008 lecture by Katz. Thanks to Francisco Pérez.

"The Homosexual in America"

The once widespread view that homosexuality is caused by heredity, or by some derangement of hormones, has been generally discarded. The consensus is that it is caused psychically, through a disabling fear of the opposite sex. The origins of this fear lie in the homosexual’s parents. The mother—either domineering and contemptuous of the father, or feeling rejected by him—makes her son a substitute for her husband, with a close-binding, overprotective relationship. Thus, she unconsciously demasculinizes him. If at the same time the father is weakly submissive to his wife or aloof and unconsciously competitive with his son, he reinforces the process. To attain normal sexual development, according to current psychoanalytic theory, a boy should be able to identify with his father’s masculine role.

Fear of the opposite sex is also believed to be the cause of Lesbianism, which is far less visible but, according to many experts, no less widespread than male homosexuality—and far more readily tolerated. Both forms are essentially a case of arrested development, a failure of learning, a refusal to accept the full responsibilities of life.

From a 1966 article in Time. I’ll pair this with a graph from the General Social Survey. The question wording is “What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?”

homosexuality.png

June 22, 2009

The “long-term” effects and non-effects of watching politically-oriented TV shows

Here’s a familiar research scenario: A research team conducts an experiment designed to assess, say, the effects of viewing a certain type of TV program. They round up some participants (maybe college students, maybe not), assign them to treatment and control groups, ask them some questions, expose them to some stimulus materials, ask them some more questions, and bid them goodbye.

Does any of this matter? Well, it could help the researchers get tenure, but in the sense of contributing much to our ability to answer the research question, what’s been learned? In a typical study, the researchers will have designed a very strong set of stimulus materials – strong in the sense of exposing the participants to clear-cut experimental manipulations – and will have assessed the implications of these manipulations immediately after exposing the participants to them. In the real world, though, many (most?) political stimuli that people react to are likely to be a bit more mixed than that, and, more importantly, the real issue is whether such exposure will have any long-term effects.

Bethany Albertson and Adria Lawrence are interested in both of these issues. In an article published in the March 2009 issue of American Politics Research, they analyze viewers’ reactions to two television programs: a five-part, Bill Moyers-hosted PBS series on drug abuse treatment, relapse, and recovery, and a fair and balanced Fox News special on California’s Proposition 209. Albertson and Lawrence’s analysis of data from a field experiment that NORC conducted in conjunction with the PBS series indicates that watching it did not increase knowledge about addiction a month later, despite viewers’ claims that they did learn from it. Watching did, however, increase the support that viewers expressed a month later for increasing the availability of treatment centers. Albertson and Lawrence put an “online-processing” spin on this pair of results: people evaluate new information as they encounter it and put it to use in developing attitudes; then, with the passage of time, they forget the information that they learned but retain the attitude. The Fox program was shorter (half an hour) and rather than presenting factual information showed a heated debate between two opponents and two proponents of Proposition 209. As with the PBS series, NORC conducted a field experiment to assess the effects of the show. Again, watching made viewers feel more knowledgeable several days after the program aired, but this time there was no effect on support for the policy issue or on polarization concerning Proposition 209.

How to account for the difference in the effects of the two experimental stimuli? The PBS series conveyed unequivocal arguments in support of funding and treatment, and it had marked effects on viewers’ attitudes. The Fox News special, by contrast, didn’t take a stand, but presented both sides of an issue – so unsurprisingly, it didn’t affect where viewers stood on the issue. The PBS series was also much longer, and it’s a well established principle that repeated exposure to a message can enhance its impact.

Albertson and Lawrence conclude that educational broadcasts “can have persistent effects on attitudes.” The results for the Fox News program, though, lead them to caution that “only particular kinds of program can induce attitude change over the long term.”

Of course, there is long-term and there is long-term. One might legitimately ask whether results from surveys conducted a few days or even a few weeks after the experimental stimulus really speak to the issue of long-term effects. But I’m encouraged by an emerging emphasis among researchers in gauging effects after the dust has at least begun to clear.

June 18, 2009

And Yet More on Twitter and Iran

Stephen Hawking once wrote a paper where the title of the first slide (I write from doubtless imperfect memory) was something like “On the Breakdown of Physics in the Region of Space-Time Singularities.” The title of the second was “On the Breakdown of Physicists in the Region of Space-Time Singularities.” Ethan Zuckerman has a smart post which suggests that the real Twitter in Iran story is about the physicists rather than the physics. The interesting social phenomenon is not the use of Twitter by Iranian dissidents, but the media’s collective convergence on framing the story of what is happening in Iran around Twitter.

One of the reasons MSM outlets are so focused on social media is that they’re not able to deploy reporters to cover these protests. In some cases, the majority of reporting from the ground is coming from social media. It’s worth asking what the biases might be in amplifying those social media reports. Ahmedinejad’s supporters tend to be poorer, more rural, less educated and more likely to speak Farsi than Mousavi’s supporters - a picture of the protests via social media runs the danger of overstating Mousavi support or minimizing Ahmedinejad support.

Iran is one of the countries American and British media pay closest attention to. The use of social media for protest - especially to promote a protest to international audiences - is far from unique. But because there’s such strong media focus on Iran, and such interest in the use of social media for protest, this is a perfect storm for interest in this topic. …

I’ve been asking some of the reporters I’ve spoken with where they were on other recent social media and protest stories. Citizen media has emerged as one of the key spaces for journalism in Fiji in the wake of a coup government that’s censoring mainstream media. It’s been a key source of information in Madagascar as that country’s suffered through a violent change of government. (One reporter who I mentioned this to remarked that Madagascar was “just a speck of an island somewhere”. That speck is twice the size of Great Britain and has the population of Australia…) …

I’ve written at some length about homophily, the tendency of birds of a feather to flock together. Turns out that reporters flock, too. It’s somewhat amazing to me the extent to which reporters from really good newspapers are all asking the same questions. I’m glad that people are taking a close look at the phenomenon of social media in the Iranian protests - it’s an important, fascinating and worthwhile topic. But there’s a lot of topics out there, and I wonder whether we benefit from a thousand well-researched stories on this phenomenon rather than a hundred, and nine hundred other stories.

Ethan’s own research is on global attention profiles - the differences in the relative amounts of attention that news sources pay to different parts of the world. This is a nice demonstration of how this may work in practice. Ethan also links to an overview of the debate by Gaurav Mishna which suggests that there are less than 10,000 Twitter users in Iran, and that only around 100 of them seem to be active (Mishna provides no source for the second figure - I presume that it is taken from his own research). Even if there turn out to be more Twitter users in Iran than Mishna’s figures indicate, I strongly suspect that his underlying claim is correct, and that Twitter has played little, and perhaps no role in actually organizing protests.

June 12, 2009

Newsmap

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This is a cool visualization of current media content. Find it at Newsmap.

June 03, 2009

Newsweek to Become Truthy

Stephen Colbert has been named first guest editor for the recently redesigned magazine in the title’s 76-year-history. Editor Jon Meacham was “just very impressed with the range of his knowledge” and “almost encyclopedic feel for anything that came up” after the two ate lunch together.

[Source.]

Some might bemoan this as yet another demeaning genuflection of political journalism before entertainment. But before they do, let me note the crawl I saw on CNN at 4:27 pm yesterday:

OCTOMOM SLAMS KATE GOSSELIN.1

By comparison, a Colbert-edited issue of Newsweek is pretty much The Federalist Papers.

1 If you must.

May 27, 2009

A new kind of spam

I just received the following unsolicited email:

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Why did this spam offend me so much? Somehow I feel like scientific communication should be above this sort of crap—sending a robot to find the emails of all authors of scientific publications and promoting some kind of crap that virtually nobody would be interested in? Ugh. I hate liars.

May 18, 2009

Media (non)coverage of campaign polls: Two cheers for the Post

The media are often, and justly, criticized for their overuse and misuse of opinion polls. There’s much more to politics than the horse race, after all, and there’s much more to gauging public opinion than just throwing together some ill-considered questions, finding some folks — doesn’t much matter who — to answer them, counting yeas and nays, and drawing overstated conclusions therefrom. My co-blogger John Sides takes special pleasure in beating up on the media (especially, it seems, Matt Bai) for such sins (here and here and here and here).

It is thus newsworthy when a prominent newspaper — in this case, the Washington Post — declines to play the usual game. There’s a governor’s race going on in Virginia, the Post ’s home turf. It’s a pretty interesting race, too, owing largely to the high-profile candidacy of Terry McAuliffe, the former DNC chair and manager of Hillary Clinton’s failed run for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008, and to the Democrats’ recent successes in Virginia gubernatorial elections (think Chuck Robb, Mark Warner, and Tim Kaine).

The campaign has been going on for quite a while now, but the normally poll-saturated pages of the Post have been bereft of polling results. Maybe this is because the Post, like many other newspapers, is having a tough time of it financially and is in cutback mode, so it’s not out commissioning its own surveys at the drop of a hat into the ring. Still, there’s quite a bit of polling going on around the governor’s race, and Post just isn’t reporting it. How come?

According to a column (gated, free) by Jon Cohen in Sunday’s Post, the answer is simple but unexpected: The Post thinks the polls that have been completed by various outfits, not to put too fine a point on it, suck, and in an unusual act of self-restraint, the Post just isn’t going to have anything to do with them. As Cohen puts it, “Our responsibility is to scrutinize the data we report as carefully as we do the sources we quote in stories. By publishing numbers of uncertain quality or ones lacking essential context, we amplify those findings, and risk misleading you.”

Good for the Post, I say. Praising an institution for not doing what it shouldn’t be doing may seem a bit over the top, but that’s what it’s come to vis-a-vis media coverage of politics, especially political campaigns.

What Makes us Happy?

This is a very interesting article, from the June 2009 issue of The Atlantic. Have a bit of a break from political science.

May 14, 2009

What Journalists Want

As a follow-up to Henry’s post, let me report on a lunch conversation I had with a political reporter for the New York Times. We talked about how political science could inform journalism and punditry.

His points were simple:

  • Journalists need the scholarship to be relevant to the day’s events. No surprise, obviously, but he also emphasized just how quickly the news cycle was moving. He estimated that there were about 3 news cycles every day, and this was a far faster pace than even a three or four years ago. Granted, some events don’t play out that quickly — e.g., the process of replacing Souter — but still: there is no doubt that political scientists who have relevant research need to move fast. We succeed in that on this blog (e.g., re: Specter) but only sometimes.
  • Journalists read widely, so there are lots of avenues by which research can filter into the collective consciousness. He mentioned Marc Ambinder as someone that has an eye on academic research and doesn’t face the exact same grind as reporters at the prestige newspapers. My observation is that folks like Ambinder and others are wonky enough to appreciate social science, a good graph, etc.
  • Political scientists aren’t the first people on the speed-dial, so we simply have to send our stuff directly to reporters. That also seems obvious, but I realized that it’s something I rarely ever do, at least to the very limited set of contacts that I have. A further gloss I’d put on this point: the relationship between individual reporters and individual academics has to be like that between reporters and other sources. It takes a while to develop. In the meantime, there’s nothing to be lost by pushing research in front of them. (This is all the more true since there is no political science Wikipedia and it’s unlikely many reporters are going to call their way down the APSA’s list.)

The upshot is this, I think. In the short term, if a goal is to bring political science research to a wider audience, and particularly those professional engaged in politics, it will happen because political scientists take the initiative. Of course, this goal is not one that every scholar shares, and that’s fine. But for those that do, the onus is on us.

May 13, 2009

What is Politics? More Thoughts on Matt Bai

A couple months ago, Henry linked to this passage from New York Times writer Matt Bai:

Generally speaking, political writers don’t think so much of political scientists, either, mostly because anyone who has ever actually worked in or covered politics can tell you that, whatever else it may be, a science isn’t one of them. Politics is, after all, the business of humans attempting to triumph over their own disorder, insecurity, competitiveness, arrogance, and infidelity; make all the equations you want, but a lot of politics is simply tactile and visual, rather than empirical. My dinnertime conversation with three Iowans may not add up to a reliable portrait of the national consensus, but it’s often more illuminating than the dissertations of academics whose idea of seeing America is a trip to the local Bed, Bath & Beyond.

I took my licks, as did Andy. In my post, I wrote:

And his description of “politics” — “the business of humans attempting to triumph over their own disorder, insecurity, competitiveness, arrogance, and infidelity” — sounds a lot like, well, life in general, not politics in particular. (It’s not my definition of politics either, but that’s a separate post.)

This is that post. I think Bai’s definition of politics is deeply problematic. A good litmus test of any definition of politics is to imagine that your spouse has come home from work. You say, “How was your day, dear?” And your spouse says, “Not so great.” You say, “What happened?” And your spouse says, “Oh, you know. Office politics.”

If we think about what is meant by a phrase like “office politics” or “church politics” or politics in any setting, it’s pretty clear that it doesn’t mean what Bai think it means. If you said to your spouse, “Office politics?”, he or she wouldn’t say, “Yeah, Betty in the next cubicle is attempting to triumph over her own disorder and insecurity.” Chances are, office politics would mean something like this: “You remember how Betty wants to chair the office picnic committee instead of me? Today she went around bad-mouthing the job I did last year so that everyone would support her.”

And that is the essence of politics: people have conflicting goals, and so a process unfolds by which they attempt to realize their goals. That process is politics. Textbook definitions of politics emphasize similar features:

Politics is the process through which individual and groups reach agreement on a course of common, or collective, action — even as they disagree on the intended goals of that action (Kernell, Jacobson, and Kousser).

Politics refers to conflicts over the character, membership, and policies of any organization to which people belong. As Harold Lasswell, a famous political scientist once put it, politics is the struggle over “who gets what, when, and how” (Lowi, Ginsberg, and Shepsle).

These definitions contrast sharply with Bai’s. Politics involves a collective (a polity, government, office, church, etc.), not atomized individuals. Politics involves disagreement over goals within that collective (up to an including even war; hence Clausewitz), not individuals who are striving to overcome personal failings. To be sure, the personal qualities of political actors can be consequential, but they are not the essence of politics. Betty may be insecure, or arrogant, or confident, or competitive, or disordered, or nice, or mean, or left-handed, or blonde, or Sagittarius, or whatever. More importantly, those qualities may help her or hurt her. (Indeed, even Bai’s thinking about personal characteristics is odd: why must individuals triumph over their arrogance or competitiveness? Don’t many politicians succeed in part because of arrogance and competitiveness?)

It’s funny that Bai himself articulates this particular definition. The title of his bookThe Argument: Billionaires, Bloggers, and the Battle to Remake Democratic Politics — suggests something much closer to the textbook definitions (conflict, etc.). Perhaps something about political science, to which he is reacting in that passage, pushes him to emphasize things that are difficult for political scientists to study and thus conclude that political science research is largely irrelevant.

Where does Bai’s definition come from? Perhaps spending a lot of time covering politics makes you more vulnerable to thinking about it in terms of individual politicians and their foibles. After all, it is the job of journalists and political writers like Bai to observe politicians frequently and at close range. You get to know them, at least to a degree. And you know that writing about politicians as individuals — their personalities, their experiences, their hobbies, their vices — engages readers. (See the study discussed here. Another of Bai’s pieces will illustrate.) So a “personalistic bias” emerges, one focused on people, rather than the overall process of politics. The fundamental attribution error also emerges, whereby political outcomes are explained in terms of individual attributes, rather than the interaction among individuals or some other situational feature. To be sure, I’m describing a tendency, not a deterministic process. But it seems operative.

May 05, 2009

Are There Good Alternatives To Local Papers?

In response to my post on the declining number of newspapers reporters who cover state capitols, commenter Joel writes:

…we might look to other news sources to pick up the slack, before we throw in the towel on the 4th estate and its role in a democracy.

Specifically, I am talking about blogs…For instance, there is a growing little community of capitol-based bloggers here in Austin, and I see no reason to think they can’t serve/aren’t serving the same role as was previously served by the reporter on the capitol beat from the Bryan/College Station Eagle. Or whatever.

Three quick thoughts in response:

1) Bloggers do useful reporting. That said, what’s the business model that sustains them? Granted, the business model of most newspapers isn’t looking so good these days, but I’m not sure what the alternative is. See this piece by David Carr, who notes the prospect of bloggers’ shilling for corporations to sustain their work. I doubt that’s a desirable model for those who do political reporting.

2) Another concern about substituting some on-line content generally for newspapers is this. Anthony Downs distinguished between information acquired accidentally and information that was sought-for. By subscribing to a newspapers, I get a lot of “accidental” information — stories in the newspaper that I wouldn’t otherwise read, which I do read simply because I’m sitting on the couch turning the pages of the paper. If I were to surf the NY Times webpage, I’d be less likely to read them. It’s true that reading content on-line does provide a sort of accidental information, but, for me at least, I tend to end up looking at old Van Halen videos that my cousin posted on Facebook:

3) Are bloggers well-situated to have the impact on political elites that the media can? At this moment, it still seems that the impact of bloggers is most notable when their efforts lead to wider coverage in the mainstream media. I worry that political elites, still stuck in the view that bloggers live in their parents’ basement, will just ignore them — until the local newspaper picks up the story. And then we’re back to why the decline of newspapers is important.

Of course, Diamond Dave was the real purpose of this post.

May 04, 2009

Statehouse Exodus

statereporters.png

This winter, AJR conducted its fifth census of newspaper reporters who cover state government, its first since 2003, and found a staggering loss of reporting firepower at America’s state capitols.

The article is here. More on the results is here. See also this earlier post.

April 21, 2009

Kevin Garnett's Knees and the Decline of Local Newspapers

I always assumed that, despite the suffering of local newspapers, local sports coverage would remain robust. Sports are far more popular than, say, politics, and so it seemed to me that local sports coverage would retain a larger audience, which would ensure that it received ample resources from newspapers.

Bill Simmons says no. His subject is Kevin Garnett’s apparently season-ending injury, which was successfully downplayed or concealed by the Celtics for several weeks.

What remains amazing was the media’s willingness to accept Boston’s strategy that could only be described as “stringing everyone along.” Garnett didn’t have an identifiable injury. This wasn’t a case of “he tore his MCL, he’ll be back in four weeks” or even “he’s got some bone chips in there, we might have to clean them out.” Really, the dude just has old knees. He put too many miles on them and played with too much intensity for too long. When the knees go, they go. That’s just the law of the NBA. It’s as simple as that.

There’s a hidden sub-story lurking here: It involves the fall of newspapers, lack of access and the future of reporting, not just with sports but with everything. I grew up reading Bob Ryan, who covered the Celtics for the Boston Globe and remains the best basketball writer alive to this day. Back in the 1970s and early ‘80s, he was overqualified to cover the team. In 1980, he would have sniffed out the B.S. signs of this KG story, kept pursuing it, kept writing about it, kept working connections and eventually broken it. True, today’s reporters don’t get the same access Ryan had, but let’s face it: If 1980 Bob Ryan was covering the Celtics right now, ESPN or someone else would lure him away. And that goes for the editors, too. The last two sports editors during the glory years of the Globe’s sports section were Vince Doria and Don Skwar, both of whom currently work for ESPN.

For the past few years, as newspapers got slowly crushed by myriad factors, a phalanx of top writers and editors fled for the greener pastures of the Internet. The quality of nearly every paper suffered, as did morale. Just two weeks ago, reports surfaced that the New York Times Company (which owns the Globe) was demanding $20 million in union concessions or it’d shut down the Globe completely. I grew up dreaming of writing a sports column for the Globe; now the paper might be gone before I turn 40. It’s inconceivable…

…But I find it a little chilling that the best player on the defending NBA champion could be sidelined for two solid months, with something obviously wrong, and nobody came close to unraveling the real story. We still don’t know what’s wrong with his knee. We just know it’s screwed up. And, yeah, you could say that Garnett has always been guarded — with just a few people in his circle of trust — and yeah, you could say that only a few members of the Celtics organization know the truth (maybe coach Doc Rivers, GM Danny Ainge, majority owner Wyc Grousbeck, the trainers and that’s it). But this was a massive local sports story. Its coverage is not a good sign for the future of sports journalism or newspapers in general.

Maybe I need to re-think my assumptions.

April 08, 2009

The Twitter Revolution

Josh Tucker sends the following, lending a little social science to the recent events in Moldova:

In the aftermath of potentially fraudulent elections on Sunday, citizens – and in particular younger citizens — of the former Soviet republic of Moldova took to the streets in large numbers yesterday in a manner that brings to mind the “colored revolutions” that swept through the region earlier this decade, although it is worth noting that it is not the outcome of the election so much as the magnitude of the victory that appears to be in question.

I have written previously about the role that electoral fraud can play in helping people to overcome the collective action problems that normally prevent citizens from protesting against abusive regimes. The gist of my argument is that in the period of time following a potentially fraudulent election the costs of protest to individual citizens may significantly be lower than usual, and the potential benefit from protest – the opportunity to actually “throw the bums out” if the election result is reversed – is much higher than usual.

One of the key factors that I identified in terms of lowering the anticipated costs of protest was the expectation that others would be protesting as well, and thus the likelihood of punishment being borne by any one particular individual would be low (as opposed to, for example, refusing to pay a bribe to a fire inspector who could then shut down your business).

The events unfolding in Moldova, however, suggest that internet-based social networking tools that were not even present during the original colored revolutions, such as Facebook and especially Twitter, may also be able to play a very valuable role in allowing even loosely organized opposition networks to coordinate protest activity. To the extent that a constant stream of Twitter posts increases any individual’s confidence that there will be more protestors in the street at a particular place at a particular point in time, it should also serve to lower the perceived costs of participation to potential protestors.

This is a development that is worth watching, because once this genie is out of the bag, it may significantly change the dynamics of how public protests develop and play out in the future. Of particular interest will be how this affects protest in “competitive authoritarian” regimes where the authorities lack the will or resources to block internet services such as Twitter but are involved in manipulating other forms of mass media.

To follow current developments in Moldova, search on #pman in Twitter (here). The “tweets” are coming in fast and furious as I write this, although one recent one just commented on the “over-hyped effects of Twitter in Moldovan protests”…

April 05, 2009

Political Scientists in The Arena

As an only occasional reader of Politico, I am late to the game on this one. But there are a number of political scientists contributing to “The Arena” — an ongoing discussion of sorts that features politicos, strategists, scholars, and others. The political scientists include Ross Baker, Jim Gimpel, Ken Goldstein, Melissa Harris-Lacewell, Stephen Hess, Tom Mann, Joseph Nye, Norman Ornstein, Larry Sabato, Theda Skocpol, Josh Tucker, Stephen Walt, and Darrell West.

(Related: David Epstein is over at Huffington Post.)

The Punditocracy Is Evolving

Ezra Klein takes it upon himself to go look at Poole-Rosenthal scores. This is good.

March 18, 2009

What Would Happen Without Local Newspapers?

12papers.graphic2.963.jpg [Source]

The specter of cities without newspapers is looming, according to accounts like this piece about The Seattle Post-Intelligencer. If that were true, what might happen?

Two interesting books by political scientists speak to this question. Notably, but not necessarily surprisingly, neither scholar has been quoted in the last year in any news article about the decline of newspapers — at least according to my quickie Lexis search.

The first book is Congress, the Press, and Political Accountability by Douglas Arnold. In 1993-94, Arnold gathered data about how 67 different local newspapers covered 187 different congressional representatives. He then merged these data with a large national election survey conducted in 1994.

He finds that greater newspaper coverage of congressional representatives makes newspaper readers more likely to: (1) report reading about the incumbent and challenger during campaign season; and (2) recognize the names of these candidates, know how long the incumbent has been in office, and like or dislike something about them.

Without local newspapers, it’s quite possible that people wouldn’t know as much about their representatives. And this has important consequences for accountability:

A basic premise of this book is that the nature of the informational environment affects prospects for accountable government. More and better information about what elected officials are doing in office increases both the chances that citizens will notice the information and the likelihood that the information will affect citizens’ decisions about whether elected officials deserve to be reelected or removed. A rich informational environment also affects how elected officials behave in office. When officials know that what they do will be reported to citizens, they behave differently than when they believe that their actions will be forever hidden.

The second book is even more relevant: Nothing to Read by Jeffery Mondak. Mondak studies the consequences of the 1992 Pittsburgh newspaper strike. The strike, which lasted from May 1992 until January 1993, ensured that Pittsburgh did not have a daily newspaper during the most of the 1992 campaign. Mondak compares then compares Pittsburgh voters to those in a similar city, Cleveland, which did not experience a strike. What did he find?

  • Pittsburgh voters did make recourse to other sources of news. They were less likely than Cleveland voters to get information from local newspapers, but more likely to get it from television, radio, magazines, and national newspapers. Those most likely to read local newspapers — people interested and informed about politics — were more likely to seek other print sources.
  • Pittsburgh and Cleveland voters were no different in how much attention they reported paying to news about the Presidential or Senate campaign. But Pittsburgh voters reported paying less attention to House campaign news.
  • Pittsburgh voters were not less knowledgeable about current events, campaign news, or the presidential candidates’ policy positions — as measured by factual questions.
  • Pittsburgh voters were not less likely to report discussing the Presidential or Senate race, but they were less likely to report discussing the House race.
  • Pittsburgh voters also differed in the kinds of information they drew on in voting for their House representative. They were more likely to depend on the views of their friends, family, and neighbors — those with whom they discussed politics. They were less likely to draw on their presidential vote. That is, there were weaker presidential “coattails” for Pittsburgh voters. Pittsburgh voters seemed to lack the information necessary to connect the House candidates and the presidential candidates.

What conclusions can we draw? Clearly, the elimination of local newspapers does not mean that people will know nothing about politics, or learn nothing about politics. As Mondak notes, some people are intrinsically motivated to follow politics and they will find a way to do so via other media. Perhaps that bodes well for the Post-Intelligencer’s future as an exclusively on-line news source.

However, “other media” may be poorly suited to providing certain kinds of information, and in particular information about local politics. This is most evident in the consequences for the Pittsburgh strike for the House race. Mondak’s findings dovetail with Arnold’s in this respect: without local news coverage, people simply pay less attention to congressional campaigns. The irony, of course, is that the House was designed to be more intimately tied to public opinion.

March 11, 2009

Political Scientists vs. Political Journalists

In the course of a review (free reg. required to read) of Matt Hindman’s The Myth of Digital Democracy, Matt Bai draws the following generalization.

At this point, it’s only fair for me to say a word about political scientists and political journalists, who generally regard one another with the same low-grade disdain that probably characterizes the relationship between, say, legal scholars and urban prosecutors. Academics who study politics often consider those of us who write about the field to be superficial, simple-minded and–the greatest indictment of all– unscientific . We interview three people in an Iowa diner and act as if we have penetrated the very soul of America. (Such allegations are, sadly, true enough.) Hindman’s book is permeated by just this kind of mild contempt for political journalists, who, in his view, have mindlessly extolled the democratizing virtues of the Internet while not possessing the basic intellectual skills necessary to quantify their assertions. The Myth of Digital Democracy features no less than eight visual figures and 21 tables, along with detailed dissections of such metrics as the “Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,” which I can’t really explain to you beyond the fact that it seems to involve Greek symbols and some algebra.

Generally speaking, political writers don’t think so much of political scientists, either, mostly because anyone who has ever actually worked in or covered politics can tell you that, whatever else it may be, a science isn’t one of them. Politics is, after all, the business of humans attempting to triumph over their own disorder, insecurity, competitiveness, arrogance, and infidelity; make all the equations you want, but a lot of politics is simply tactile and visual, rather than empirical. My dinnertime conversation with three Iowans may not add up to a reliable portrait of the national consensus, but it’s often more illuminating than the dissertations of academics whose idea of seeing America is a trip to the local Bed, Bath & Beyond.

Discuss.

February 25, 2009

Newspapers, blogs and partisanship

Paul Starr writes a New Republic piece on the poor prospects for the newspaper trade, and quotes real, live political science.

In the early decades of television up to the 1970s, as Prior reminds us in his book Post-Broadcast Democracy, the three networks virtually had a captive audience when they broadcast the evening news at the same time. Although many people coming home from work might have preferred entertainment, they watched the national news with Walter Cronkite or Chet Huntley and David Brinkley and they learned something about politics and world events. As cable and then satellite television developed, however, viewers were able to make choices that corresponded more closely to their preferences. According to Prior, a large group, perhaps three out of ten viewers, fled the news for entertainment programs, while a smaller number, perhaps one of every ten, began watching more news and political discussion now that they had access to Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC.

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February 24, 2009

Thank You Mr. Robinson?

Sometimes I’ll ask my (almost) 4 year twin boys a difficult question. They’ll think about the question, and if they don’t know the answer, they simply respond by saying, “Daddy, I don’t know the answer to that question.” I wish Mr. Robinson could respond to a question he doesn’t know like my sons (excluding the Daddy part of course). Here’s the exchange between Eugene Robinson (columnist for the Washington Post) and David Gregory on Meet the Press last week:

MR. GREGORY: Here’s a question. On the economy overall…how are we going to know if it’s working, and how much time does Obama really have?

MR. ROBINSON: It’s a, it’s a good question. I think there’s a realization in the country that this doesn’t happen overnight, that you—that, that we’ve dug such a deep hole and it’s taken so long to do it that, that, you know, I think if, if things are perceived to have stopped getting worse in, in—within six months, say…

MR. GREGORY: Mm-hmm.

MR. ROBINSON: …or, or, or nine months, and, and if, if we can—think we can see a bottom then, you know, I think people’ll give him some more time…

Thank you Mr. Robinson for letting us know that we’ll know if the stimulus is working if “we can see a bottom.” Why can’t journalist (or maybe it’s more accurate to say columnists) who have no expertise in a particular field, just respond by saying “I don’t know, you should ask an expert.”

January 16, 2009

Horse-race political science

kentucky-derby.jpg

David Walker’s assessment of the performance of forecasting models of the 2008 election provides an occasion for me to raise a question that troubles me about these models, which, to use the old World War II phrase, is “Is this trip really necessary?” By “this trip,” I’m referring to Walker’s article only indirectly. My question is really directed toward the practice of political science-based election forecasting.

Others may tell the story differently, but I’ll begin with John Mueller’s oft-cited study, War, Presidents and Public Opinion. Mueller’s work lives on today in the cottage industry of analyses of presidential popularity that his study prompted. But Mueller also, albeit inadvertently, provided a basis for election forecasting by political scientists when, in the course of discussing the peculiarities of Gallup’s presidential popularity question, he offhandedly dismissed the president’s standing in the polls as “a very imperfect indicator of electoral success or failure for a president seeking reelection.” But could that really be true? He presented no data to support his supposition, and it seemed implausible that the president’s standing in the polls would have little bearing on his performance on Election Day.

Intrigued, other researchers — myself included — rushed in to put Mueller’s assertion to the test, and what they uncovered, contra Mueller, was a very high correlation between presidents’ job ratings in the final pre-election Gallup Poll and their share of the popular votes in general election. These reanalyses weren’t theoretically progressive or methodologically innovative. They simply took issue with a brief digression in Mueller’s wide-ranging consideration of presidential popularity. Point made, case closed, yes?

Well, no.

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January 01, 2009

It's, like, um, you know, a double standard

Over at Polysigh, John Pitney notes that the New York Times, in making fun of Caroline Kennedy for her verbal tics, was employing a double standard — probably, Pitney argues, because Kennedy had irritated the Times reporters. Pitney uses a Barack Obama statement that the Times scrubbed before printing to make his point about the double standard. Convincingly, I think. Here’s the link.

November 13, 2008

The difficulties of communication between political scientists and journalists

Go here and scroll down to “P.P.S.”

October 23, 2008

Tina Fey's Earning Potential

I was thinking this very thought just the other day, and just now I encountered it in this clever graphic, submitted by Peter W. to graphjam.com:

tinafey.bmp

Those of a certain age will probably remember Vaughn Meader, who did an immensely popular imitation of JFK in the early 1960s. Meader’s career officially crashed on November 22, 1963. To be sure, Vaughn Meader was a one-trick pony, and Tina Fey isn’t. So her career will outlive Sarah Palin’s candidacy for Vice President. (Even if McCain-Palin were somehow to win, I suspect that Tina Fey would tire of doing the same thing over and over, and the joke would get pretty stale pretty soon anyway. So she’d go back the good career she’d been having before any of us had ever heard of Sarah Palin.) But Meader does provide an historical precedent for the point the graph is making.

October 11, 2008

Listening in on the presidential candidates: 1908

taft.jpg wjbryan.jpg

I’m not making a commission on this, but anyway…

It turns out that in 1908, Thomas Edison recorded a series of two-minute mini-speeches by the competing presidential candidates, William Howard Taft and William Jennings Bryan. These recordings were marketed on cylinders for 35 cents apiece and are said — here I’m quoting Terry Teachout in today’s Wall Street Journal — “to have sold in huge quantities at a time when it was still a novelty for presidential candidates to make any sort of personal appearances.”

I haven’t listened to the speeches yet myself, but if Teachout is right then today’s listeners will probably find them interesting not so much for their substance as their style:

I expect that the recorded speeches of Bryan and Taft would strike most listeners as being a trifle on the dull side. No punch lines, no poll-tested sound bites, no dear-sir-you-cur sideswipes at the other way — just two sober-sided, middle-aged gents talking seriously about serious matters. Such was the way in which presidential candidates used to conduct themselves, and in 1908 the phonograph, the newest of new media, was enlisted to help them do it in the manner to which they were accustomed, only more efficiently. What a difference a century makes.

Archephone Records has just released the recordings of all 22 of these speeches. To order ($18.99 for the CD plus a 79-page booklet), click here, where you can also sneak a quick listen.

October 05, 2008

Red State Blue State Book Getting Some Airtime

Check out one of my co-authors, Boris Shor, getting interviewed on Chicago’s PBS station.** Not bad for an academic.

http://tinyurl.com/wttw-interview

** I know station here is redundant but it just sounds strange without it. BTW Boris, I love that book cover.

October 01, 2008

Meet the Press "Roundtable" on the Economy?

As I was watching my retirement and my children’s college accounts evaporate before my very eyes, and trying to understand the current credit crisis, I turned to Meet the Press to get some insightful answers. First up, Secretary Henry Paulson. Good guest to explain things. Second up, Mayor Bloomberg. While most mayors would have little to offer in this regard, Bloomberg’s previous life as CEO of Bloomberg, LLP puts him in a unique position to offer some interesting insight. Good guest. Last up, a “roundtable” discussion on the economy. So here, I’m expecting a round table discussion by former council of economic advisers, such as, N. Gregory Mankiw, R. Glenn Hubbard, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Michael J. Boskin, or Martin Feldstein. Instead we get, Steve Pearlstein**, Steve Liesman and Erin Burnett. Tom Brokaw, c’mon…you can do better.

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September 26, 2008

Genes and political attitudes

The LA Times tells us today about political science research suggesting that your genes are what make you a conservative or liberal.

Die-hard liberals and conservatives aren’t made; they’re born. It’s literally in their DNA. That’s the implication of a study by a group of researchers who wanted to see if there was a biological basis for people’s political attitudes. They found to their surprise that opinions on such contentious subjects as gun control, pacifism and capital punishment are strongly associated with physiological traits that are probably present at birth.

Or maybe not. Aaron Wiener at the Washington Independent decided to do a bit of research into this story’s background.

Intrigued, I called the study’s head researcher, Douglas Oxley of the University of Nebraska, to see if he agreed with this conclusion.

“In some ways [the study has] been misinterpreted,” said Oxley. He said that his study didn’t find a link between DNA and political leanings. “We could have things happen to us in the womb or later in life that could cause” physiological and ideological differences. The study, released yesterday, tested the physiological responses of 46 participants to various threatening images, like bloody faces. It found that people who self-identified as “in favor of socially protective policies” responded much more strongly to the stimuli than people who held more liberal views on such issues as welfare, abortion, immigration, gay rights and school prayer.

The researchers concluded that people of different ideological persuasions have divergent physiological reactions, and that people with socially conservative views tend to be more shocked by potentially threatening stimuli. “Some people have said that we’re calling conservatives ‘frightened’ or something along those lines,” Oxley said. “And we’re not. All we’re suggesting is that there’s a physiological difference between people who hold one set of political beliefs and people who hold another set of political beliefs.”

This won’t be surprising to anyone who’s talked to journalists about their research - my batting average so far for accurate representations of what I told ‘em is about 50% (and that’s a lot higher than many other political scientists). Journalists frequently come to a story with their own preconceived framing of what you should be saying, and can be pretty stubborn about sticking to this framing, even when it’s completely at odds with what you tell them. I suspect that this is especially likely to be a problem for studies like this, since journalists have learned that cod-evolutionary psychology stories about how genes cause this, that and the other usually sell to their editors - hence the desire to shoehorn this research into a finding about genetics, even when the authors weren’t talking about genes at all.

September 24, 2008

Media coverage of campaign spots: "Man bites dog" lives on

It hardly needs to be said that there’s a widespread and long-standing media bias toward coverage of the new, the unusual, the exciting, the sensational, the “different,” and a corresponding bias against coverage of the mundane, everyday events of life and, for that matter, of political campaigns. The latter makes for boring viewing and reading and isn’t really “news.” Thus, for example, candidates may deliver campaign speeches multiple times per day, multiple times per week, in which they say 90 or 95% of the very same thing they said in their speeches the day before. And yet the media stories about these speeches won’t say, for example, “Senator Barack Obama again today repeated his oft-delivered criticism of the Bush administration for …” Rather, they’ll pull out something new and different, if they can find it, from the latest speech — the 5 or 10% that’s new today (a gaffe, a one-line zinger, whatever) — and make that the story du jour. This incremental coverage approach has consequences. If most of what one reads in the paper every day are “Man Bites Dog” stories — that is, coverage of the unusual — then one might well come to think that the unusual is in fact the norm and lose sight of the fact that “Dog Bites Man” is the far more common occurrence. In the political context, a candidate’s main message, repeated over and over and over again, may be X, but a citizen who follows the campaign by reading the daily newspaper or watching the evening news would be justified in perceiving that message as a smattering of other points (call them A-W) that change every day and don’t add up to much of anything.

With these considerations in mind, I was especially interested to encounter, in this morning’s Washington Post, an story by Howard Kurtz on the McCain and Obama campaigns’ TV spots, and more specifically on which spots they’ve spent a lot of money on showing and which ones they haven’t.

Here’s the general pattern.

Continue reading "Media coverage of campaign spots: "Man bites dog" lives on" »

September 08, 2008

Academics, journalists and hot-button issues

Simon Jackman has an interesting post on Larry Bartels and political science’s relationship with broader public debates.

I think it is true that the end of political science focusing on American politics has dropped the ball somewhat, substantively and normatively. A political science colleague who shall remain nameless caricatures this type of political science (and the political scientists doing it) with a good imitation of a 1950s sci-fi robot going “Congress, congress…”, the idea being that the professional, academic study of American politics is largely dominated by a bunch of geeks doing technical analyses of “inside baseball” stuff that might not matter to anyone other than those doing it (and by the way, a good deal of my own work would probably fall under that characterization).

Larry’s book might be a little “academic” for the non-academic reader. He uses data (gasp) and statistical analyses to test propositions. But frankly, I welcome the jab in the ribs Larry is (implicitly?) giving to some of us in the political science profession, reflected in the tone of the review I quoted above: “there’s an awful lot of politics going on out there” (paraphrasing my colleague Josh Cohen).

Maybe this is more about my insecurities with my professional identity (and btw, Larry was my PhD adviser), but I see one of the big takeaways from the book as this: there are big topics like inequality to go take on under the heading of “American politics”, and we can and perhaps ought to risk normative neutrality, without giving up analytical rigor.

Jackman’s argument suggests both that many mainstream Americanist political scientists have been socialized to avoid writing about certain topics because they are ‘too political’ and that this is a rather odd thing in a discipline which is supposed to be about politics. I think that things are getting better, but I also think that there’s some truth to this claim (my co-bloggers may disagree). More precisely (and this may be more me than Jackman) - there is a space for political science that reaches sound empirical conclusions on questions that are hotly debated between partisans - but that this space is often unoccupied because talking about topics of partisan controversy makes political scientists nervous (as an aside, there is a real distinction between the kind of political science that could be conducted on partisan hot-button topics and partisan commentary of the sort that, say, I, sometimes indulge myself in the latter on the other blog that I contribute to).

I suspect that Matt Yglesias is pointing to a similar mechanism, which shapes the conscious decision of elite political commentators like Marc Ambinder to steer clear of persistently calling politicians on their lies, when they have in fact lied. One would presume that political commentators don’t like politicians to tell blatant lies and get away with it, but it may be easier for them not to criticize politicians for doing this, because they don’t want to become part of the controversy themselves. Both groups - political scientists and political commentators - have constructed professional identities which place them outside the partisan fray. In neither case is this a bad thing in itself - we want to have people who aren’t beholden to some group or another providing commentary on politics. But - and this is Jackman’s challenge as I understand it - this understandable desire not to become part of that which they study and comment on, may lead political scientists (and commentators) to fall down on the job of providing the complete understanding of politics that they are supposed to, by avoiding certain topics, not singling out certain kinds of bad behaviour &c&c..

August 31, 2008

Democratizing the tools of visualization? But watch out for the data-as-chartjunk phenomenon

Lee points me to this news article by Anne Eisenberg about the website Many Eyes, which allows people to upload data and visualize it in cool ways. A great idea, but the example used to illustrate the article is just horrible:

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It’s a classic example of a graph that looks cool but is just confusing. The data are presented in two dimensions, but the two dimensions don’t mean anything, there are lots of colors with no apparent rhyme or reason, and tons of cool techy-looking details that don’t do anything for me. I’d prefer some bar graphs or (if people can handle it) line plots. It was probably a bad idea that this tool was presented in a newspaper column entitled “Novelties.” I’d rather see graphics be in a column called “Essentials.”

But, hey, everything’s gotta start somewhere. At some point, maybe the fad of cool-looking graphs will go away, and people can settle down to something serious.

P.S. I have no problem with cool—for example, see here for a wonderful applet on the New York Times website—but I think graphmakers have to avoid the data-as-chartjunk phenomenon, in which real data are presented but in a way that makes little sense.

August 20, 2008

Political Science among the punditocracy

One of the missions of the Monkey Cage is to bring a better understanding of political science to the punditocracy. But perhaps bringing political scientists to the punditocracy would be even better. And Rachel Maddow, who has just gotten her own show on MSNBC, has a doctorate in political science from Oxford. I’m not aware of any other political science Ph.Ds who are card carrying political commenters - are there any? (of course there are political scientists like Larry Sabato who often provide quotes to the media, but I think that’s a different thing).

July 24, 2008

The Main Thing

What do you say when you strike a pedestrian with your car, the pedestrian goes up onto and then off of the hood, you continue driving for a block until a bicyclist cuts you off and forces you to stop, and then the police cite you for failing to yield to a pedestrian, who, in this case may be hurt?

If you’re Robert Novak, you say “I didn’t know I hit him…I feel terrible…[But] he’s not dead, that’s the main thing.”

July 10, 2008

Media Competition and Media Bias

John’s recent post about political blogs reminded me of an analysis that appeared a couple of years ago in the American Economic Review, “The Market for News,” by Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shleifer (AER 95, 4, September 2005, pp. 1031-1053).

Being economists, Mullainathan and Shleifer begin by distinguishing between supply-side and demand-side explanations of media bias. The former explanations attribute bias to the preferences of journalists, editors, or owners. The latter see bias as reflecting the news providers’ profit-maximizing choice to cater to consumers’ preferences. The focus of Mullainathan and Shleifer’s analysis is on the demand side.

A traditional economics-based account of news consumers’ motivations would center on their desire to get accurate information, which should force media outlets to deliver accurate information. An alternative account, however, would be that “audiences want their sources not only to inform but also to explain, interpret, persuade, and entertain.” And here’s where it gets interesting: “To meet this demand, media outlets do not provide unadulterated information, but rather tell stories that hang together and have a point of view.” On the former account, media reporting should be unbiased. On the latter, though, bias should be commonplace, on the assumptions that consumers of the news themselves hold biased beliefs and prefer to hear or read news that is consistent with their beliefs.

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July 04, 2008

A Lamentation of Google et al.

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I’m a split-personality technophile-Luddite. I seem to buy just about every new technotoy as soon as it hits the market and love it until the next new technotoy comes along, at which point I set the old one aside and have a fling with the new one, and the cycle spins and spins and spins. Increasingly I rely on younger colleagues — the younger, the better — to help me solve the manifold mysteries that these widgets hold out for someone who grew up in a pre-television world. At the same time, while I’m reading magazines and even books online, I’m carping about how much I hate to see amazon.com and Google and JSTOR and their ilk displacing bookstores and libraries and good old-fashioned browsing, about how much I enjoy reading a real, i.e., paper copy of the morning paper, about how much better the literary quality of our professional journals was back in the old days before the spell-check and grammar-check routines that are built into word processors made it easy to scribble something down and send it off without worrying about the subtler niceties of style. So yes, I want it both ways. Nothing wrong with that.

Some of my ambivalence is nicely expressed in the following excerpt from Nicholas Carr’s essay in the current issue of The Atlantic, provocatively titled “Is Google Making Us Stupid?”:

Continue reading "A Lamentation of Google et al." »

June 23, 2008

The Incredible Vanishing War

You don’t have to be a dyed-in-the-wool McLuhanite to recognize that media coverage is instrumental in setting the political agenda. If the media ignore an issue, then for large segments of the American it simply doesn’t exist. If the media play it up, public consciousness rises. This isn’t inevitable, but it’s a common enough phenomenon to register as a reliable generalization.

In that context, a story in this morning’s New York Times warrants serious notice. It turns out that ABC, NBC, and CBS have cut back — way back — on their coverage of Iraq. In 2007, the three networks jointly devoted 1,157 minutes of airtime to Iraq. So far this year, which is almost half over, the counterpart figure is 181 minutes. Oh, and what was that other place? I’d almost forgotten: Afghanistan. So far this year, 46 minutes of network coverage.

For the full story, click here.

June 04, 2008

The Importance of Selective Exposure

Uncivil exchanges in political debate shows do not diminish confidence in public officials, government institutions, and the media among those who choose to watch them.

That is from a recent paper by Kevin Arceneaux and Martin Johnson. There has been growing concern that contentious political programming “hurts America.” That, of course, is Jon Stewart’s famous line when he went on “Crossfire” to take down “Crossfire.” Some political science research — discussed by Lee in this previous post — also finds that exposing people to shows like “Crossfire” makes them less trusting of government.

The problem, as Arceneaux and Johnson note, is that previous research randomly assigns people to watch specific kinds of programs, but in reality, our television habits are far from random. So Arceneaux and Johnson set up an experimental design in which people were either forced to watch a political debate show (“Hannity and Colmes”), or could choose among “Hannity and Colmes” and two other, non-political programs. This is a small pilot study, but the results are noteworthy.

The people who spent the most time watching “Hannity and Colmes” were not sensitive political naïfs. They were partisans interested in politics. Unsurprisingly, then, those subjects who were allowed to choose their program did not emerge from the experiment less trusting in government: those who might have been turned off by “Hannity and Colmes” tended not to watch it. However, even those who chose to watch “Hannity and Colmes” emerged somewhat less sure of their own ability to affect politics — an attribute political scientists call “internal efficacy” — as did subjects forced to watch “Hannity and Colmes.”

Given this research, and that of Markus Prior on increasing media choice, the next wave of media effects research will likely have to incorporate people’s tendency toward selective exposure.

The Arceneaux and Johnson paper is here. Recommended.

May 22, 2008

Are Jews Drifting to the Right?

That’s what Jodi Kantor says in the New York Times:

But in recent presidential elections, Jews have drifted somewhat to the right.

Really? I took the state-level exit polls for each presidential election from 1988-2004 and combined them into one big file for each election year. This produces relatively large samples of Jewish voters (~1,000 each year). Here is the percentage of Jewish voters choosing the Democratic candidate:

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Looks like a leftward drift. In 1988, 71% of Jewish voters supported Dukakis. In 2004, 79% supported Kerry. And you don’t even have to crunch the data. I typed “jewish vote” into Google and the very first link told me the same thing.1

Kantor is not wrong about her central thesis, although she fails to cite any systematic data to prove it: Obama’s current support among Jewish Americans is lower than that of these past Democratic candidates. Since Kantor doesn’t present any polling data about an Obama-McCain match-up, I went and found some. Just like before, it was hard: I typed “poll jew obama” into Google. Here was the first hit, a poll cited in the May 9th edition of the Jerusalem Post:

A new Gallup survey found that 61% of Jewish voters prefer Obama to McCain, who got 32% of the Jewish support.

That’s how you write a story about what voters think. Don’t make vague claims about recent history, such as the “rightward shift,” without backing it up. And then, if you really want to make the case, don’t only talk to a handful of people in Boynton Beach and Boca Raton. Find some hard evidence. Google will even do it for you.

ADDENDUM: See Andrew Gelman’s post with data from the National Election Study.

[1] This webpage’s data doesn’t precisely match mine, perhaps because they are using the (smaller) national exit poll file rather than the merged state-level files that I use. In fact, they find that the percent of Jews supporting Dukakis in 1988 is even lower (64%); the difference may arise because there wasn’t a separate exit poll in every state that year and so my combined state file is missing some data. In any case, the “rightward shift” is not plausible. In fact, if anything, the leftward shift is larger, especially if you compare 1988-2004 to earlier elections in the 1970 and 1980s.

May 19, 2008

Good Journalism about Social Science

Since I was recently complaining about the lack of political science in journalism, let me also give credit where credit is due. This piece, by John Judis in The New Republic, does a nice job surveying relevant literature about race from political science and psychology, including work by Tali Mendelberg, David Sears, Donald Kinder, Nicholas Valentino, Vincent Hutchings, and Ismail White. Judis’ piece is distinctive for treating social science as if it has some nuance — in particular, discussing existing debates rather than treating the debates as settled. There are, of course, further nuances and debates that he does not discuss, but, given the limits of magazine journalism, he still deserves kudos.

[Hat tip to Clyde Wilcox]

May 13, 2008

"The Daily Show" as Journalism -- Or Not

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The folks over at Pew’s Project for Excellence in Journalism have just completed a comprehensive analysis of Comedy Central’s “Daily Show,” starring the perpetually smirky Jon Stewart. The point of departure for their study was that Stewart recently tied with heavyweight teleprompter-readers Brian Williams, Dan Rather, Tom Brokaw, and Anderson Cooper in a nationwide survey as as America’s most admired journalist. (Of course, if you pay much attention to the network news shows these days, which seem to consist primarily of ads for drug companies, a headline and sound-bite or two, and lots of lifestyle fluff, you’ll realize that such recognition comes closer to guilt by association than to a true honor.)

Anyway, the Pew researchers decided to explore the extent to which what’s shown on the “Daily Show” accords with journalistic standards like comprehensive coverage of various types of news and equal time for representatives of various viewpoints. The results are contained in a lengthy report, HERE.

The main conclusions?

The results reveal a television program that draws on the news events of the day but picks selectively among them—heavily emphasizing national politics and ignoring other news events entirely. In that regard, The Daily Show closely resembles the news agenda of a number of cable news programs as well as talk radio.

The program also makes heavy use of news footage, often in a documentary way that employs archival video to show contrast and contradiction, even if the purpose is satirical rather than reportorial. At other times, the show also blends facts and fantasy in a way that no news program hopefully ever would.

In short, “The Daily Show” doesn’t pass muster as a news program. Despite the wealth of interesting detail presented in the Pew report, this is not exactly a “Stop the presses!” conclusion. After all, “The Daily Show” appears on Comedy Central and, as Jon Stewart himself has sometimes had to remind his critics, “We’re not a news show.”

May 11, 2008

Helping Hands for George Stephanopoulos

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In the spirit of John Sides’s selfless offer of himself and David Park as regression-runners and findings-interpreters for New York Times columnist David Brooks (HERE), I hereby volunteer John and David’s services to ABC News political analyst George Stephanopoulos as well. (I myself am much too busy blogging about cats to become involved in such an undertaking.)

This offer is prompted by the following exchange between anchorman Charles Gibson and Stephanopoulos on May 6, 2008, the evening of the Indiana and North Carolina primaries:

GIBSON: And joining me now is our chief Washington correspondent, George Stephanopoulos, who is here in New York tonight. …

STEPHANOPOULOS: … Let’s look at those numbers. … We did ask a question I know in the exit polls about Reverend Wright, Barack Obama’s former pastor and whether that was influencing voters. What did we find? Right down the middle. About half said it’s important, about half said it was unimportant. Of those who said it was important, look at this in Indiana, 70% went for Senator Clinton. Of those who thought it was unimportant, again right down the middle, 65% for Barack Obama. So what you thought about the importance of Reverend Wright basically determined your vote.

Now, George Stephanopoulos, who graduated summa cum laude from an Ivy League school (Columbia), is no dummy. The concluding sentence of his summary of the survey results is so fundamentally flawed, though, that one can only wonder what they were teaching in all those political science courses that he took (he was a political science major) or whether the time he spent in the Clinton White House so addled him that it’s all gotten jumbled in his head.

The most basic lesson one is supposed to learn in one’s very first research methods course is — repeat after me, everybody — “Correlation is not the same as causation.” Now, with that thought in mind, go back and re-read the offending sentence: “So what you thought about the importance of Reverend Wright basically determined your vote.” Do you begin to see the problem?

The causal spin that Stephanopoulos put on these survey results assumes, in effect, that heading into the Indiana and North Carolina primaries most voters weren’t committed to one candidate or the other. Then the Reverend Wright issue emerged, and — presto! — it split the Democratic electorate into two groups, Clinton voters and Obama voters.

Instead, let’s begin with a decidedly different, and altogether more plausible assumption. Let’s say that heading into these two primaries, which after all occurred very late in the primary season, most voters were already pretty well committed to one or the other of the two candidates. Then the Reverend Wright issue emerged. For many of those who were already intending to vote for Clinton, that issue reinforced their existing inclination; certainly it wouldn’t have transformed them from Clinton supporters into Obama supporters. For many (presumably most) of those who were already intending to vote for Obama, though, the Wright issue wasn’t sufficient to persuade them of the error of their ways and move them into the Clinton column.

Then on election day along came an exit poll interviewer asking them how important the issue had been to them. Naturally, many of the Clintonites cited it as a reason for voting for Clinton rather than Obama — because it had been consistent with that intention and also because it had also emerged late enough to still be retrievable from memory. But how many Obama supporters would cite it as a reason for having voted for Obama? As the issue played out, that simply wouldn’t make sense; it was a one-way or “valence” issue, and its valence was anti-Obama. So Clinton supporters were more likely to cite the Wright issue as underlying their vote choice than were Obama supporters — the same statistical finding that Stephanopoulos reported but with a very different interpretation.

The problem, stated more generally, is that when pollsters ask voters which issues were most important to them, what the voters tell them can’t be taken at anything approaching face value. People just aren’t reliable reporters of their own mental processes. (The classic statement of this point is Nisbett and Wilson’s “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,” Psychological Review 84 (May 1977), pp. 231-259.) In the context under consideration here, this unreliability typically takes the form of ex post facto rationalizations: Those who were predisposed to vote for Candidate X cite the issues that X had raised as the decisive ones, and those who were predisposed to vote for Candidate Y cite Y’s issues as decisive. Look back over several decades of ANES post-election surveys and you’ll see this pattern time and time again. Or save yourself the trouble and hunt down a copy of Wendy Rahn, Jon Krosnick, and Marijke Breuning’s “Rationalization and Derivation Processes in Survey Studies of Political Candidate Evaluation” (American Journal of Political Science 38 (August 1994), pp. 582-600), the bottom line of which is that “Voters’ reports of the reasons for their preferences were principally rationalizations.”

My point isn’t that the Reverend Wright matter was wholly inconsequential. It may well have figured into the decision calculus of some late-deciders in Indiana and North Carolina. But that’s a world away from concluding based on the data that Stephanopoulos had in hand that “What you thought about the importance of Reverend Wright basically determined your vote.”

Columbia has an excellent political science department. Perhaps as a public service they should bring back their erstwhile star student for some refresher courses in research methods and electoral behavior. Or maybe Stephanopoulos will decide to take me up on my sincere offer of John and David’s assistance.

May 06, 2008

On the Relationship between Journalism and Social Science

In response to my post below on David Brooks, Ian McDonald comments:

Your last paragraph (tongue in cheek, I guess) makes me wonder: what do you think is the right symbiosis between good journalism and good social science?

I ask because: I think good journalism needs to take risks. I am a big David Brooks fan and I will cut him a lot of slack on factual precision, because he asks good questions, and he always entertains me. While he writes about his social disparity ideas a lot, I don’t agree that he’s completely vested in one interpretation (see the last paragraph of this Atlantic piece). http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/12/brooks.htm

Sure, some pundits get it wrong, habitually, because of self-serving motives, and thus poison the conversation. I think you would agree: Brooks isn’t one of them.

At the same time, nobody wants to be flat out wrong (I think). Maybe social scientists and journalists really can help each other. Proactively and hate free. And still make deadlines and stay interesting.

Ian raises a very good question. I completely agree that social scientists and journalists can work together.

My further thoughts are these. First, I want to distinguish between David Brooks and journalism. Obviously, he writes columns, not news articles, and thus is in the business of commentary, not reporting. Brooks is also often an amateur social scientist, and, as such, I hold him to a weaker version of the standards to which academics are held. That is to say, I wasn’t at all joking when I said this:

If it’s asking too much for Brooks to spend half an hour with the National Election Studies before writing a column like this, then consider this my job application. David Brooks, I will make pretty graphs and easy-to-read cross-tabulations for you. Just say the word. (David Park is ready to run your regressions.) Give us a call.

I would not demand that David Brooks worry about all of the ideals of empirical social science: rigorous theories, careful conceptualization and measurement, appropriate evidence, caution in drawing inferences from inherently limited data. But what I am suggesting — simple analysis to confirm the most basic thrust of a hypothesis — is not asking too much. In fact, given the platform Brooks has at the Times, it is his responsibility not to present arguments without making more of an effort to confirm them with data, where appropriate. I think his bad arguments — e.g., red and blue states — actually do violence to our discourse about politics. (See also Barry’s comment on my original post.) If Brooks wants to take risks by proffering new ideas without digging up the necessary evidence, then he needs to moderate his tone to convey the appropriate uncertainty.

Yes, I realize that columnists have an incentive to be provocative. Yes, they write on deadline. And yes, most do not have the necessary skills to analyze large datasets. That is why my offer to help Brooks do analysis is not at all facetious or sarcastic. I really would do it. And for much less than the $4000 Bill Kristol is paid to write each column.

What about reporters and journalists?

Continue reading "On the Relationship between Journalism and Social Science" »

April 24, 2008

Negative Advertising – The Gift That Just Keeps On Giving

Televised campaign ads live two lives. First, there are the paid-for showings of the ads themselves. An ad may get shown just once in a single media market or dozens of times in hundreds of markets. In recent years, thanks to data made available by the Brennan Center at NYU and the Political Advertising Project at the University of Wisconsin, we’ve learned a great deal about how often these ads are shown, at what cost (though I’ll have more on that in an upcoming post), to how many people, and with what effects.

Second and, increasingly, there is free media coverage of the ads. Campaign ads, in a weird sort of “pseudo-events create new political reality” way, have transmogrified into one of the major media stories of modern gubernatorial, congressional, and presidential campaigns. To some extent, such media coverage may blunt the force of a particular ad by exposing misstatements or half-truths therein. Offsetting this blunting effect or perhaps, in many instances, overwhelming it, though, are the time-honored ideas that “There is no such thing as bad publicity” and “If you tell the Big Lie often enough, people will start to believe it.” That is, the charges and countercharges in a campaign ad may, thanks to the attendant publicity, take on a life of their own. And the ultimate test for a candidate may not prove to be whether those charges and countercharges are “right” or “wrong” (and few these days seem to be all of one or all of the other), but rather how the candidates react to them. If they do so slowly and haltingly (e.g., Kerry in 2004) or virtually not at all (e.g. Dukakis in 1988), then the attacks, having been aired by the parties and their allies and then given further prominence by media coverage, may sound a death knell for their candidacy. Letting oneself get put on the defensive seems increasingly to be taken as bona fide evidence that one is unqualified to serve in high political office.

In a forthcoming article in the Political Research Quarterly (“Free Advertising: How the Media Amplify Campaign Messages”), Travis Ridout and Glen R. Smith of Washington State University turn the spotlight on the second life of campaign ads by intensively exploring media coverage of commercials in ten of the 2004 Senate campaigns. Ridout and Smith report two basic results:

  • “Ad amplification” via media coverage of paid commercials is indeed widespread. I think it’s fair to say that we already “knew” this, but having our impressions and intuitions validated via careful analysis is valuable nonetheless.
  • The most media-amplified ads are the comparative and negative ones. Positive ads capture less media attention.

It’s the second result, of course, that’s really interesting. Media definitions of what is “news” encompass dimensions like conflict, drama, corruption, and malfeasance. By these and related standards, an ad proclaiming that Senator X has been voting against the public interest because of financial contributions from malevolent lobbying groups — well, that’s likely to bear looking into as a good news story. Meanwhile, an ad proclaiming that Governor Y has done an effective job of introducing some new programs and administering some existing ones — that’s no story at all. (Until, that is, Governor Y’s opponent calls those claims into question. Now, that’s news. And so it goes.)

Even if media coverage of a particular ad is critical, identifying distortions or counterpoints, it keeps the ad alive by exposing those who missed it when it aired on TV to what the candidates are saying about one another – adding fuel to the fire sparked by the ad itself and, given the media’s disproportionate focus on negative and comparative ads, thereby adding to the viciousness of this particular vicious cycle.

April 23, 2008

Was There Bias in Media Coverage of the March to War in Iraq?

There have been many criticisms and self-criticisms of media coverage in the months before the Iraq War began (see, e.g., here and here). But systematic data is only starting to emerge.

Matt Guardino and Danny Hayes have examined every story about Iraq that appeared on ABC and CBS between August 1, 2002, and the beginning of the war, March 19, 2003 — 908 stories in all.

Their main conclusion is:

Bush administration officials were the most frequently quoted sources, the voices of anti-war groups and opposition Democrats were barely audible, and the overall thrust of coverage favored a pro-war perspective.

Dissenting views did appear, but, notably, they came not from domestic sources, such as Democrats and others opposed to the war:

Instead of emanating from Democratic elites, leaders of the anti-war movement within the United States, or other sources of domestic dissent, however, the campaign against a war—at least according to network TV news—was spearheaded by Saddam Hussein and other foreign leaders.

Guardino and Hayes note that perhaps relying on Hussein and, say, Jacques Chirac doesn’t put the anti-war case in the best possible light:

But by going overseas for that perspective—to France, Germany, Iraq, and elsewhere—the anti-war view was accorded a difficult position, from the perspective of domestic public opinion. It is well known that source credibility is central to the persuasiveness of communication, political or otherwise. And while many Americans were skeptical of the Bush administration’s motivations for a confrontation with Iraq, we would surmise that even greater skepticism infused Americans’ perceptions of Saddam Hussein’s arguments about why war was a bad idea.

That is putting it mildly, needless to say. The paper is here.

April 07, 2008

The Media and Public Acceptance of Conspiracy Theories: The Case of 9/11

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Conspiracy theories of major sociopolitical events abound. The September 11 tragedy is no exception — indeed, it may be the textbook case. Who believes in conspiracy theories of the September 11 attacks, and where did they get these ideas?

Those are the questions that motivated Carl Stempel, Thomas Hargrove, and Guido Stempel III’s study of “Media Use, Social Structure, and Belief in 9/11 Conspiracy Theories” (Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, Summer 2007).

The study drew on two theoretical perspectives. According to the “paranoid style” theory, “conspiratorial thinking is more prevalent among members of marginalized … or declining groups for reasons of insularity, status insecurities or declining status, powerlessness, and weak communal ties.” Moreover, “less legitimate and less regulated media sources, such as tabloids, Internet blogs [Now hold on a minute! “The Monkey Cage” is an extremely legitimate source!], and radio talk shows” play a major role in creating and spreading conspiracy beliefs,but “establishment’ media have no such impact.

The “cultural sociology” theory places greater emphasis on the rational aspects of conspiracy thinking. “In this view the media do not promote conspiracy theories so much by circulating particular rumors and conspiracies, as by raising people’s awareness and cynicism about how much goes on in the backstages of governmental and corporate power.” This perspective implies that belief in 9/11 conspiracy theories shouldn’t be restricted to a small group of social and cultural isolates; rather, it should be “aligned with mainstream political divisons and the discourses built up around those divisions.” Thus, for example, Democrats might be more accepting of 9/11 conspiracy theories “because they fit their view that influential members of the Bush administration were looking for an excuse to invade Iraq.”

Overall, 36% of the members of the national sample for his study considered it at least somewhat likely that “People in the federal government either assisted in the 9/11 attacks or took no action to prevent the attacks because they wanted the United States to go to war in the Middle East.” 12% went so far as to consider it somewhat or very likely that “The Pentagon was not struck by an airliner but instead was hit by a cruise missile fired by the millitary.” And 16% thought it somewhat or very likely that “The collapse of the Twin Towers in New York was aided by explosives secretly planed in the two buildings.”

Whereas readers of daily newspapers were less likely to consider the first of those three scenarios likely, getting news from blogs and tabloids was positively associated with conspiratorial thinking; blogs were the only news source related to believing in that U.S. forces had bombed the Pentagon; and both blog and tabloid readers were more likely to accept the idea that bombs had been planted in the World Trade Center. In terms of social characteristics, believers of all three conspiracy ideas were, as expected, more likely to be members of less powerful social groups or categories.

These findings wee consistent with predictions based on both of the theories from which the authors drew their research hypotheses, suggesting that acceptance of conspiracy theories of September 11 ican be understood in ways that are consistent with two broad perspectives on social structuring and media use.

These results are provocative, but it remains an open question whether Stempel et al. have really isolated a causal relationship in which certain social factors —-> media use patterns —-> acceptance of conspiracy theories. The obvious fly in the ointment is that of self-selection. That is, an assumption underlying the “paranoid style” and “cultural sociology” theories was that reading certain types of material fosters certain types of beliefs. It could well be, though, that holding certain types of beliefs leads people to read certain types of material. Although untangling that causal knot is a task well beyond the capacity of a cross-sectional survey, the findings presented in this study could provide a good starting point for experimental research that can speak more directly to the issue of causality.

April 03, 2008

Gatekeepers in the Press: Photo Coverage of Katrina

katrina.jpg

Most American newspapers — all but a select few — rely on syndicates and wire services for their coverage of national and international affairs. A paper may have its own distinctive editorial slant, but its shared reliance, with hundreds of other papers, on a common set of sources of national and international news undoubtedly introduces greater homogeneity into news coverage than would exist if most papers sent their own reporters out to cover the news. (To be sure, even then considerable homogeneity would remain, given the tendencies toward news management by those in positions of authority and toward “pack journalism” among news reporters.)

This is not to say, however, that newspapers are merely passive recipients of what they tear off the AP or Reuters news ticker. They print only a small fraction of the enormous volume of materials that they receive every day, and what they deem fit to print may be a highly unrepresentative slice of those materials.

Analyses of media content typically focus on the spoken or written word, but a recent study (“What Katrina Revealed: A Visual Analysis of the Hurricane Coverage by News Wires and U.S. Newspapers,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, August 2007) has turned the spotlight on the visual component of media coverage. The starting point for that study was the criteria that journalists use to define “newsworthiness”: prominence/importance, human interest, conflict/controversy, unusualness, timeliness, and proximity. The authors of the study, Shahira Falmy, James D. Kelley, and Yung Soo Kim, hypothesized that these criteria would be borne out in press coverage of the devastation that Hurricane Katrina caused to the Gulf Coast in 2005. To test their hypothesis, they sampled photographs from the AP and Reuters archives and matched them against the photos that actually appeared on the front pages of 400 American newspapers.

These comparisons revealed that the photos that actually appeared in these papers were unrepresentative of the photos that they received from the wire services. Among other things, the pictures that made it into these papers conveyed greater emotionality, portrayed more victims of the storm and fewer public officials, and (presumably in line with the norms of “up close and personal coverage”) showed fewer aerial depictions of the storm’s devastation.

Who, then, were the real gatekeepers? That is, who decided which images the reading public would receive of the aftermath of Katrina? The first cut was made by the wire services, in the form of their decisions about which photos to make available to their client newspapers. That first cut was obviously crucial, for newspapers can’t publish pictures that they never receive in the first place. But neither can they publish more than a few of the pictures that they do receive, and it was at this stage that a second round of gatekeeping decisions got made in the case of Katrina coverage. As the authors conclude:

Photojournalism has its own entrenched traditions, practices, and values. These represent the filters through which the day’s photos are routinely screened for presentation in our daily newspapers. The visual reporting in newspapers is much more than a playlist provided by the wire services passed on to readers. Instead, photo editors reference news values particular to their discipline and audience as they produce the dialy visual report of a news event.

Not all the biases of news coverage are “partisan” or “political.” Many of them stem directly from long-established, deeply-entrenched journalistic professional values, norms, and standards. Falmy, Kelley, and Kim’s study provides new confirmation of the operation of these factors and their potential for shaping public reactions to the news of the day.

March 18, 2008

Covering Bad News -- No Longer Forbidden in China

The mass media in China, though still largely state-owned and centrally controlled, are enjoying greater freedom, sometimes even to carry “very negative and critical stories” about government officials. “Although these negative reports [are] mostly restricted to local officials,…still it is a big step forward compared to the past.”

Here, in support of that conclusion, is a data snippet from a recent analysis (abstract here) of news reports, 1990-2003, that have won the China Radio and Television Awards, which were established as an incentive to excellence in Chinese journalism.

chinapositive.jpg

As the author of the study, Xi Chen (a Ph.D. candidate in the Planning, Governance and Globalization Program at Virginia Tech), concludes:

The facts that journalists are reporting ‘dark’ stories which are not supposed to increase support for the party and government … and are disclosing the frauds and deceptions practiced by local officials, and paying more attention to the harsh situation in the remote western and southwestern area of the country all demonstrate that they are becoming more professional and are playing more of a role of agent rather than the mouthpiece for the government as before.

Now, let’s not go overboard. No one is claiming that China now has anything approaching a free press that provides “fair and balanced” news coverage — see, e.g., this recent posting by James Fallows on Chinese coverage of the situation in Tibet. But a step forward is…well, a step forward.

March 06, 2008

The White House Press Corps: Lapdogs, Watchdogs, or Mutts?

Eisenhower_conference.gif

Over the years, scholarly and popular treatments of government-media relations have alternated between depicting the press as a watchdog or a lapdog, or even both at the same time. In a recent issue of the American Sociological Review (Ihere) a team of researchers from UCLA and the RAND Corporation headed by Steven Clayman takes up this issue in the context of the aggressiveness of reporters’ questions in presidential news conferences.

Clayman and his colleagues drew a sample of four news conferences per year, 1953-2000, coding the questions that reporters asked according to their active versus passive content, their directness, their assertiveness, their adversarialness, and their calling upon the president for justification of his policies or actions. They then related these scores to a wide array of situational factors that they hypothesized to underlie differences from news conference to news conference in the aggressiveness of the reporters’ questions. These analyses revealed that:

  • Over the period encompassed by the study, which ranged from the beginning of Eisenhower’s first term — the photo above is from his first press conference — to the end of Clinton’s second term, reporters’ aggressiveness increased significantly.
  • Second-term news conferences evoked more aggressive questioning than their first-term counterparts, though no short-run “honeymoon” effect surfaced during a president’s first term.
  • A president’s current standing in the polls had no independent effect on reporters’ aggressiveness.
  • Aggressiveness was, however, greater when the unemployment and prime interest rates were higher.
  • Reporters were less aggressive when asking about foreign than domestic affairs.

Based on this set of results, Clayman et al. conclude that:

…journalists modulate their aggressiveness in complex ways that do not readily map onto any single model of the journalism-state relationship. Some patterns (e.g., aggressive questioning is conditioned by objective economic circumstnaces rather than presidential popularity) are consistent with an elaborated version of the watchdog model. Other patterns (e.g., aggressiveness is reduced for foreign and military questions) identify domains of journalistic deference toward the president, although even foreign/military questions become more aggressive when the economy is in decline.

February 16, 2008

Conservative Dominance of Political Talk Radio

rushlimbaugh.jpg

Tune in to a political talk radio show these days and what are you likely to hear? Probably a conservative host lambasting the left (or, for that matter, excoriating John McCain). A 2007 report by the Center for American Progress and Free Press documented the conservative dominance of political talk radio.

First a clarification: The political leaning of the researchers obviously tilts leftward (the Center for American Progress bills itself as a “progressive think tank”), but their methodology was so straightforward and transparent that one can judge for oneself the extent to which this could have mattered. (See below for one response from conservative critics of the report.) What they did was (1) classify the various talk show hosts as either “conservative” or “progressive” (placing, for example, Bill Bennett, G. Gordon Liddy, and Rush Limbaugh in the former category and Air America, Bill Press, and Al Sharpton, among others, in the latter); and (2) second, record the amount of airplay that each side got on the 257 news/talk stations owned by the top five commercial station owners during May of 2007. Here are some of their findings:

Continue reading "Conservative Dominance of Political Talk Radio" »

February 13, 2008

On the other hand

While no-one ever went broke underestimating the tastefulness of the American public, I suspect that this video will not be winning many new voters over to Hillary 2008.

February 11, 2008

10,000 years

I suspect that this viral video is going to get a lot of pick-up … (via Chris Hayes)

February 10, 2008

NEWSWEEK Goes Neuropolitical

Need a quick briefing on recent developments in research on voter decision-making? Where do you turn? How about an academic journal like Political Psychology? Fine, but maybe it’s too specialized for your purposes. Or a “bridge” journal that has as part of its mission presenting highly specialized political science research in a way that the rest of us can digest, like Perspectives on Politics? Yup, but they may never get around to the topic you’re interested in. Maybe even The New Yorker, which regularly publishes articles along parallel lines by Malcolm Gladwell? Well, okay, but again, you might have to wait for years until anything pertinent appears there. Well, then, how about a newsweekly – Time, Newsweek, or US News? Nah – that would be silly.

But yah. The very first words on the cover of the February 11 issue of Newsweek, right up there where you can’t miss ‘em, are: “The Science of Voting.”

newsweekcover.jpg

Open up the issue and beginning on page 34 you’ll find a piece, here, by Sharon Begley, who does a pretty good job of delivering cognitively-oriented political psychology to the masses, or at least to that portion of the masses that takes enough interest in public affairs to subscribe to a newsweekly. Included in the article are quotes from and/or references to research by political scientists Rick Lau, Sam Popkin, George Marcus, and Pippa Norris. The Newsweek story is inevitably superficial – no one could realistically hope to provide in-depth coverage of such a complicated and wide-ranging topic in three pages (which is a lot for a Newsweek story, though it would be a mere drop in the bucket for The New Yorker) – but it’s not bad at all, and it’s nice to see political scientists being treated as serious researchers rather than just as inside dopesters.

(By the way, Newsweek is on something of a cognitive neuroscience kick. See Begley’s “Mind Reading Is Now Possible” piece in the January 21 issue, here.)

[Hat tip to Stanley Feldman]

February 06, 2008

Conservative and liberal bloggers

Eszter Hargittai and her colleagues have some interesting research,1 which I’ve blogged about before, on linking patterns and partisanship in the blogosphere. Among the other data they report is some that suggests that conservatives are more likely to respond substantively to liberals than vice-versa.

Straw-man arguments account for 43% of the 42 links from conservative blogs to liberals in our sample, and 54% of the 63 links from liberal blogs to conservatives in our group of entries that include cross-ideological linkages. …Posts that concretely address the content of a blog entry from an ideological opponent represent about a quarter (26%) of all conservative and about one fifth (21%) of all liberal posts with cross-ideological links. Substantive disagreement accounted for 12% of links from conservative to liberal blogs and 16% of links from liberals to conservatives, while substantive agreement accounted for 14% of links from conservatives to liberals and 5% of pointers from liberals to conservatives.

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January 23, 2008

More on the Political Impact of Video

Yesterday I posted about a study of the growth of “image bites” and the decline of “sound bites” on network television news. After reading that post, my colleague Gina Lambright asked whether any other research has been done on the political impact of video versus audio; this was a natural question for her to ask, for her spouse is a news photographer. Anyway, the answer is yes. As Exhibit A (other exhibits will follow in due course), let me point to a nice piece of work that Jamie Druckman completed a few years ago.

The first Kennedy-Nixon debate in the 1960 presidential campaign has lived on in memory as a turning point not so much because of what the candidates said but rather because of how they looked. Kennedy looked like … well, Kennedy, and Nixon looked like an especially unflattering caricature of himself. Everyone “knows” that Nixon’s unattractive appearance led him to be perceived as the loser of the debate. However, the evidence that supports that conclusion turns out upon inspection, to be somewhere in the range of weak to nonexistent. Until Druckman’s study, the only reasonably credible evidence came from a post-debate survey that indicated that those who had listened to the debate on the radio were more likely to think Nixon had won, but those who watched it on television were more likely to see Kennedy as the winner. That’s a nifty result, if valid, but Druckman questions its validity for a host of methodological reasons that I won’t go into here except to say that they’re pretty compelling.

In an attempt to clear things up, Druckman ran an experiment, the participants in which (mostly undergraduate students) had no prior knowledge of the Kennedy-Nixon debates. These participants were either shown the debate on television or had the audio played for them. Druckman suspected that watching the debate would lead them to base their assessments of the candidates more on personality traits, and that proved to be the case; at the same time, agreeing with a candidate on the issues significantly affected the audio-only participants’ assessments of the candidates, but the same didn’t hold true for those who had had the video as wel as the audio input. Druckman also expected viewers to learn more factual content than listeners, largely because television is more likely to hold people’s attention than audio-only input is. That, too, proved to be the case. As for “bottom-line” evaluations of the two candidates, viewers did turn out to be more likely to see Kennedy as the winner of the debate. As Druckman concluded:

This is compelling evidence that television – by enhancing the impact of image – can make a difference in overall candidate (debater) evaluations. It also is the first clear empirical evidence consistent with the widespread assertion of viewer-listener disagreement in the first Kennedy-Nixon debate. In sum, television images have an independent effect on individuals’ political judgments: they elevate the importance of perceived personality factors, which can in turn alter overall evaluations.”

Here, then, we have an instance in which rigorous social science research supports the conventional wisdom. What everybody “knew” turned out to be right after all. (Click here for an abstract of Druckman’s study.)

January 05, 2008

"Fair and Balanced" Perceptions of TV News Coverage?

The operation of source-credibility effects — roughly, that I may believe something if X says it but discount it if it comes instead from Y — is well established in social psychological research on attitude formation and change. But here’s an interesting new twist, in the context of current controversies over “fair and balanced” political coverage by the media.

In a study reported in the latest issue of Political Behavior (abstract here), Joel Turner notes that many Americans perceive TV news coverage as ideologically biased. As cases in point, Turner singles out the widespread sense that the Fox News Channel tilts to the right while CNN leans left.

Studies of bias in reporting of the news typically “content analyze” news reports from various media outlets to determine whether they are presenting more or less the same picture of current events. The bias hypothesis is sustained to the extent that such content is found to vary across outlets.

Turner took a different tack. He deliberately held content constant and looked for another type of bias — bias among TV viewers based not on what they were seeing and hearing, but on the channel they (thought they) were watching.

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December 19, 2007

The Corrosive Effects of "In-Your-Face" Televised Political Discourse

When most Americans discuss politics, their conversations are with those who share their own political perspectives. How, then, do they hear the “other side of the story,” and what happens when they do? Television is one of the primary conduits through which they are exposed to contrary views — and a study by Diana Mutz in the November 2007 issue of the American Political Science Review “suggests that television does, indeed, have the capacity to encourage greater awareness of oppositional perspectives.”

That isn’t necessarily good news, though, for under certain circumstances familiarity appears more likely to breed contempt than empathy. The uncivil, “in-your-face” character of much televised political discourse can, Mutz finds, “cause audiences to view oppositional perspectives as less legitimate than they would have otherwise.” People do learn from such exchanges, but “The ‘in-your-face’ intimacy of uncivil political discourse on television discourages the kind of mutual respect that might sustain perspections of a legitimate opposition. …Seeing politicians argue about their disagreeable policies up-close and personal rather than from a distance intensifies citizens’ negativity toward those people and ideas that they dislike.”

Click here for the full text of this article.

December 10, 2007

Let's Factcheck Campaigns and Elections Magazine

From this piece (gated) in Campaigns and Elections magazine:

Since most Republicans live in rural America, where they are less likely to have broadband Internet, “we’re not fighting with a fair piece of the pie,” [“Republican Internet strategist David] All says. [Carol] Darr [a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School] also points to differences between the parties. “The people who are white and working-class tend to be Republican, particularly those who are white, working-class, and religious.” She characterizes Democrats as “ostensibly being the part of the poor and working class, but they end up being the yuppie party and most people at universities tend to be Democrats.”

Percentage of Republicans who live in rural areas: 24%
[Source: 2004 American National Election Survey]

Percentage of Republicans who have Internet access: 77%
Percentage of Democrats who have Internet access: 69%
[Source: 2004 American National Election Survey]

Percentage of Republicans who do not have broadband access: 21%
Percentage of Democrats who do not have broadband access: 21%
[Source: November 2006 Pew Survey. Lack of broadband access is defined as someone who uses the Internet at home via a dial-up modem.]

The claims that “most” Republican live in rural areas and that Republicans have less access to high-speed Internet access are easy to verify. Too bad no one did.

December 07, 2007

More on the Media and Ideological Bias

In response to my original post, John Samples of the Cato Institute expands on his comments on the post over at Cato’s blog. Because this is a long post, I’ll respond to several of John’s comments below the fold.

But first, let me highlight a paper cited by another commenter, which is authored by Valentino Larcinese, Riccardo Puglisi, and James M. Snyder, Jr. and is available here:

We study the agenda-setting political behavior of a large sample of U.S. newspapers during the last decade, and the behavior of smaller samples for longer time periods. Our purpose is to examine the intensity of coverage of economic issues as a function of the underlying economic conditions and the political affiliation of the incumbent president, focusing on unemployment, inflation, the federal budget and the trade deficit. We investigate whether there is any significant correlation between the endorsement policy of newspapers, and the differential coverage of bad/good economic news as a function of the president’s political affiliation. We find evidence that newspapers with pro-Democratic endorsement pattern systematically give more coverage to high unemployment when the incumbent president is a Republican than when the president is Democratic, compared to newspapers with pro-Republican endorsement pattern. This result is not driven by the partisanship of readers. There is on the contrary no evidence of a partisan bias — or at least of a bias that is correlated with the endorsement policy — for stories on inflation, budget deficit or trade deficit.

Now, on to John Samples’ comments…

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What's the Point of "Journalism" Like This?

The Washington Post runs a daily presidential campaign feature titled “The Trail.” Today’s edition includes three separate items — one on support for Hillary Clinton’s candidacy from three major groups, another on the cancellation of a key Senate vote that would have forced some candidates to alter their schedules, and the third … the third … about … well, it’s hard to say. Here it is, in toto (though, last time I checked, Toto was back in Kansas, not in Iowa):

AMES, Iowa — Chancey and Bud Montang are a couple without a candidate.

Bud, a financial analyst, and Chancey, who worked in advertising before she quit several years ago to home-school their four children, had beensome of the leading backers in Ames of Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.), who recently dropped out of the race after struggling to raise money and to move in the polls.

When the agreed to watch Mitt Romney’s faith speech with a reporter Thursday morning, both said before it started that they were unlikely to back the former Massachusetts governor — not because of his Mormonism but because of their concerns about his previous support of abortion rights. He not only failed to win over either of them with his speech, but he didn’t seem to move them any closer to his side.

The Montangs, who are heavily involved in their Catholic church, kept pointing to what they saw as a contradiction in Romney’s speech; in their minds, he was saying that his faith is important but that it will not affect his decisions.

“If his faith is truly in the fiber of his being, every decision he makes is affected by it,” Bud Montang said. “You can’t say your faith isn’t going to affect your decisions. It is who you are completely.” As Romney said he would not “jettison” his religion, but not take guidance from Mormon leaders, Chancey Montang grew frustrated.

“You can’t have it separate and together,” she said. “It’s one or the other.”

—Perry Bacon Jr.

Just exactly what is newsworthy here? That two people who weren’t attracted to a candidate before he gave a speech still weren’t attracted to him afterwards? Stop the presses! That the Montangs are such important people that we need to know what they thought of Romney’s speech? With all due respect to the Montangs, who may be very nice folks, they don’t seem more important than, say, the average Iowan. Oh! Maybe that’s the point — they’re supposed to be, in effect, an N=2 microcosm of Iowa. But the very fact that they were supporters of Sam Brownback establishes that they aren’t representative of much of anything.

This is lazy “human-interest” journalism at its worst, and it’s hard to fathom why the Post would run an item like this one. Maybe tomorrow they’ll carry an equally enlightening feature about how beautiful Dennis Kucinich’s wife is — but, no, that was yesterday!

December 06, 2007

Are the Media Ideologically Biased?

Are the media ideologically biased? Yes, and they’re liberal, if you’re Bernard Goldberg or countless others. Yes, and they’re conservative, if you’re Noam Chomsky or countless others.

Courtesy of Brendan Nyhan — himself a political science graduate student — here is a “no” vote from former White House advisor Dan Bartlett:

TM: Do you think the press corps is responsible for putting that word out—that the president was lying [about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq]?

BARTLETT: I don’t think they’re purposely doing it. Look, I get asked the question all the time: How do you deal with them when they’re all liberal? I’ve found that most of them are not ideologically driven. Do I think that a lot of them don’t agree with the president? No doubt about it. But impact, above all else, is what matters. All they’re worried about is, can I have the front-page byline? Can I lead the evening newscast? And unfortunately, that requires them to not do in-depth studies about President Bush’s health care plan or No Child Left Behind. It’s who’s up, who’s down: Cheney hates Condi, Condi hates Cheney.

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December 04, 2007

Media Coverage of American Politics: A Core Reading List

In the December 1 Wall Street Journal, Tom Brokaw steers readers toward five books that in his view collectively “present a peerless portrait of journalism’s high aims and low comedy”: The Boys on the Bus, by Timothy Crouse; All the President’s Men, by Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein; Scoop, by Evelyn Waugh; Murrow, by A.M. Sperber; and Amusing Ourselves to Death, by Neil Postman.

For conveying an understanding of media coverage of American politics, I hereby second Brokaw’s nominations of The Boys on the Bus and Amusing Ourselves to Death. But Brokaw’s a newsman and I’m not. Instead of the up-close-and-personal journalism thrust of the other three items on his list, I’d replace those selections with a dated but still pertinent journal article and three old-favorite books that just keep on giving: Warren Breed’s “Social Control in the Newroom: A Functional Analysis” (Social Forces, 33 (May 1955), pp. 326-335); The Symbolic Uses of Politics, by Murray Edelman; The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America, by Daniel Boorstin; and, inescapably, Understanding Media, by Marshall McLuhan.

My selections may well reflect nothing more than my idiosyncrasies — or, for that matter, my age — so disagreements and alternative suggestions would be more than welcome.