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June 10, 2008

Legitimating the EU

I’m in Ireland at the moment, unwinding for a few days after sending in my book manuscript. But I’m not unwinding completely, As I note over at Crooked Timber, there is a quite important referendum taking place on Thursday. After the failure to ratify the so-called European Constitution (it was voted down in referendums in France and Holland), the EU member states are trying for a second bite of the cherry, with a somewhat modified document, the so-called Lisbon Treaty. In the wake of their problems the last time, they’ve decided not to give European voters the chance to turn it down, except in Ireland, where they have to for domestic constitutional reasons. This is an interesting test of arguments about European legitimacy, and in particular Andrew Moravcsik’s claim (see here for a relatively recent statement) that EU institutional changes neither need nor should have direct political legitimation.

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Does Oil Hurt Women's Rights?

Women have made less progress toward gender equality in the Middle East than in any other region. Many observers claim this is due to the region’s Islamic traditions. I suggest that oil, not Islam, is at fault; and that oil production also explains why women lag behind in many other countries. Oil production reduces the number of women in the labor force, which in turn reduces their political influence. As a result, oil-producing states are left with atypically strong patriarchal norms, laws, and political institutions.

That is Michael Ross in the latest American Political Science Review. The paper is here. In the statistical analyses, oil rents per capita are associated with lower female labor force participation and fewer female seats in parliament — controlling for factors such as GDP per capita, region (Middle East, etc.), the proportion of the country that is Muslim, and other demographic and institutional characteristics of states. Moreover, if one focuses only on the Middle East, these same findings hold.

See also Ross’ work on how oil contributes to civil war and other conflicts — here in the Journal of Peace Research and here in Foreign Affairs.

March 23, 2008

The perquisites of office

Andy Gelman links to a new paper on money and UK politics. The abstract speaks for itself.

While the role of money in policymaking is a central question in political economy research, surprisingly little attention has been given to the rents politicians actually derive from politics. We use both matching and a regression discontinuity design to analyze an original dataset on the estates of recently deceased British politicians. We find that serving in Parliament roughly doubled the wealth at death of Conservative MPs but had no discernible effect on the wealth of Labour MPs. We argue that Conservative MPs profited from office in a lax regulatory environment by using their political positions to obtain outside work as directors, consultants, and lobbyists, both while in office and after retirement. Our results are consistent with anecdotal evidence on MPs’ outside financial dealings but suggest that the magnitude of Conservatives’ financial gains from office was larger than has been appreciated.

Andy isn’t sure about the substantive impact that this has for political science, given the disparities between the amounts of money that flows through politicians’ hands in functioning democracies and the amounts of money that they may personally derive from office. I’m not so sure about that, as the monies sticking to politicians’ hands do likely help shape their incentives (e.g. one can plausibly speculate that Tories who rock the boat too much aren’t going to have much luck cashing in on those directorships), but, in any event, the fact that Andy doesn’t spot any obvious methodological problems makes me at least think that the observed effect is likely real.

[Cross-posted at Crooked Timber]

March 18, 2008

Covering Bad News -- No Longer Forbidden in China

The mass media in China, though still largely state-owned and centrally controlled, are enjoying greater freedom, sometimes even to carry “very negative and critical stories” about government officials. “Although these negative reports [are] mostly restricted to local officials,…still it is a big step forward compared to the past.”

Here, in support of that conclusion, is a data snippet from a recent analysis (abstract here) of news reports, 1990-2003, that have won the China Radio and Television Awards, which were established as an incentive to excellence in Chinese journalism.

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As the author of the study, Xi Chen (a Ph.D. candidate in the Planning, Governance and Globalization Program at Virginia Tech), concludes:

The facts that journalists are reporting ‘dark’ stories which are not supposed to increase support for the party and government … and are disclosing the frauds and deceptions practiced by local officials, and paying more attention to the harsh situation in the remote western and southwestern area of the country all demonstrate that they are becoming more professional and are playing more of a role of agent rather than the mouthpiece for the government as before.

Now, let’s not go overboard. No one is claiming that China now has anything approaching a free press that provides “fair and balanced” news coverage — see, e.g., this recent posting by James Fallows on Chinese coverage of the situation in Tibet. But a step forward is…well, a step forward.

March 13, 2008

All in the Family: How Political Leaders Secure Their Regimes

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George W. Bush has two, but Saddam Hussein had six. Bill Clinton has one, but Kim il-Sung (shown above with the infant Kim Jong-il) had seven. Ronald Reagan had three, but the Sultan of Brunei has 10. John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon had two apiece, but Idi Amin had somewhere between 30 and 45.

Do you see any pattern here?

I’m speaking, of course, of children.

On the assumption that what matters most to political leaders is survival, Dustin Beckett and Gregory D. Hess argue, in essence, that leaders are motivated to immortalize themselves or at least to secure the future of their regime (abstract here). This motivation, in turn, leads them to try to influence the selection of their successor. From the leader’s perspective, trust in one’s presumed successor is vital, or else a successor might pull a Khrushchev by disassociating himself from the legacy of the leader. (I’m aware that Khrushchev wasn’t Stalin’s immediate successor, but you get the point.)

How, then, to ensure that one can trust one’s likely successor to carry on as one would wish? Because blood is thicker than water, the safest route is to keep it all in the family. For the leader of a non-democratic system, then, the best way to assure a “trustworthy succession match” is to sire a whole lot of children, in hopes that by the luck of the genetic draw one of them will turn out to be a “person who can successfully maintain the regime and the expropriation of rents, and with whom the enforcement of ex-ante promises is less problematic.” (As you can tell from the way they talk, Beckett and Hess are economists.)

By contrast, leaders in democratic systems find themselves more hemmed in by those bothersome checks and balances, and so many other people have a say in the choice of their successor that democratic leaders can’t do all that much to determine who is next in the line of succession anyway.

From these considerations, Beckett and Hess extract the expectation that the leaders of non-democratic systems will sire more children than their democratic counterparts, in hopes of finding the trustworthy succession match that they so avidly seek.

Sounds pretty far-fetched, doesn’t it?

Well, Beckett and Hess’ empirics, based on the composition of the families of 221 leaders worldwide and a wide array of country- and leader-level data, indicate that the leaders of non-democracies do indeed produce more offspring than the leaders of democracies; Idi Amin may have been an outlier, but his autocratic peers also tend to be prolific begetters. On average, the leaders of fully non-democratic countries have sired between 1.5 and 2.5 more children than the leaders of fully democratic countries — and this relationship holds up when a wide array of statistical controls are instituted. (So it’s not just that, say, the leaders of Muslim countries, most of which are non-democratic, have lots of wives and sire lots of children. There’s more to it than that.)

To which I must caution that the empirical relationship that Beckett and Hess observe is a matter of differences of degree, on average, rather than a universal generalization. Exceptions come fairly quickly to mind. Stalin, for example, had only three children (which could, if one buys Beckett and Hess’ argument, help explain the destalinization that occurred soon after his death). And some democratic leaders do produce a large number of children. John Adams, for example, had five, Willliam Henry Harrison had nine, and George H.W. Bush had six. But perhaps these are just exceptions that prove Beckett and Hess’ rule: When it comes to succession (whether immediate, as in the Adams and Bush cases, or delayed, as with the Harrisons), the more children, the better.

February 18, 2008

2007: "A Notable Setback for Global Freedom"

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The new Freedom House ratings of democracy around the world, released a few weeks ago, indicate that 2007 wasn’t a good year for the advance of democracy and freedom.

In case you don’t know about the Freedom House ratings, here’s a little background. Every year since 1972, Freedom House has issued an annual report on the global status of democracy. In a nutshell, every country is categorized annually as “free,” “partially free,” or “not free,” depending on where it stands on the two dimensions of political rights and civil liberties. (These classifications are shown in the tiny map above, a larger version of which is available in the report itself. Countries shown in green are “free”; those shown in yellow are “partially free”; and those shown in purple are “not free.”) Based on these ratings, the countries’ progression toward democracy or regression away from it is also charted annually. The Freedom House ratings are a bit rough and ready, and other, more sophisticated measurement approaches are available (see, e.g., the recent piece by Shawn Treier and Simon Jackman — abstract here), but for purposes of mapping democracy over time these ratings are unrivaled.

Here’s the lead from the narrative portion of the Freedom House report:

The year 2007 was marked by a notable setback for global freedom. The decline, which was reflected in reversals in one-fifth of the world’s countries, was most pronounced in South Asia, but also reached significant levels in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. It affected a substantial number of large and politically important countries—including Russia, Pakistan, Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria, and Venezuela—whose declines have wider regional and global implications. Other countries experienced reversals after a period of progress toward democracy, including pivotal states in the Arab Middle East. While many more countries suffered declines than registered improvements, the degree of change reflected in some countries was modest while in others the decline was more substantial. …[The] results for 2007 marked the second consecutive year in which the survey registered a decline in freedom, representing the first two-year setback in the past 15 years. In all, nearly four times as many countries showed significant declines during the year as registered improvements.

And here are some particulars:

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