The Monkey Cage

Barry Pump, a doctoral student in political science at the University of Washington, sends this analysis.

First, the Democrats:

Why did 36 Democratic members of the House of Representatives hold health care reform hostage to an abortion amendment?

I analyzed Saturday’s six votes relating to health care reform by combination. So, there were 32 potential combinations from the first vote on previous question for the rule to final passage. Two-thirds of all Democrats voted the party-line across all votes, and all Democrats voted against John Boehner’s Republican substitute amendment. But something Speaker Pelosi said about the controversial Stupak Amendment on abortion restrictions during her visit to Seattle on Monday piqued my interest: “The provision that you’re talking about would have been in the bill one way or another. The Republicans would have put it as a motion to recommit—not to get too much into this—we thought it was better to have it as an amendment that could be voted up or down, rather than a provision in the motion to recommit, which would take down the whole bill.”

What Pelosi was saying, essentially, is that some Democrats would not vote for the final health care bill but for Stupak’s anti-abortion amendment. Looking at how the members’ votes broke down across votes is instructive. Some Democrats (15) voted for the amendment but against final passage anyway. Five members voted for the amendment and for final passage, but oddly, voted for the Republican motion to recommit. But 36 members voted like all other Democrats but for their aye vote on the Stupak Amendment. Without their support, Pelosi never would have been able to pass the bill. The Stupak amendment, then, was their side-payment.

Looking at those 36 members in greater detail, however, reveals interesting patterns. Five of the 36 are powerful House committee chairmen: James Oberstar (MN-Transportation and Infrastructure), David Obey (WI-Appropriations), Nick Rahall (WV-Natural Resources), Silvestre Reyes (TX-Intelligence), and John Spratt (SC-Budget). Others are recognizable, reliable Democratic votes: John Murtha (PA), Marcy Kaptur (OH), Paul Kanjorski (PA), Dale Kildee (MI), and James Langevin (RI). The question becomes why would these members hold health care reform hostage for the sake of abortion politics? Presumably, they’d have a lot to lose if health care reform failed and Democrats bore the brunt of public dissatisfaction with their leadership (or lack thereof).

A common response (a la David Mayhew’s “Electoral Connection”) is that these members have electorally-induced preferences to vote against abortion funding. This explanation works well with the 10 Democrats from the South, where a majority of public opinion is not on the side of abortion rights. But that doesn’t necessarily work in the case of long-time members with powerful committee chairs in safe districts, like Jim Oberstar or Dave Obey. The explanation is also lacking when you consider people like John Murtha, who, if he was going to be voted out of office, would have been a long time ago and for non-abortion related issues.

A uniting characteristic among 25 of the 36 members, however, is their Roman Catholic faith. The other members are from the south or from conservative areas, like Baron Hill (IN) and Zach Space (OH). One potential explanation for the members’ motivation is their religious beliefs, particularly when the US Conference for Catholic Bishops was running full-page newspaper ads condemning Congress for voting to fund abortions for low-income women as part of the public insurance option.

If Pelosi’s accurate in that these members would have sunk the entire bill but for the Stupak amendment, then what this means is that these members put their religious beliefs — or potentially their political interests rooted in religious beliefs — before providing health care reform. This analysis both explains why Pelosi allowed an amendment so displeasing to her party’s liberal base, and the motivations for the members who championed it. In the process, it asks implicit questions about sincere policy preferences and the extent to which a party can operate a sticks-and-carrots approach to voting discipline.

And now, the Republicans:

One last question, though: If Republicans knew they could sink health care reform by voting against the Stupak amendment, thereby assuring its defeat and, then, later the entire bill for lack of Catholic Democratic support, why didn’t they? Perhaps ideological consistency in policy matters more than the prospect of political victory.

Ideological consistency, or their own electoral calculations. I don’t know, however, if Republicans knew they could potentially sink health care reform in this fashion.

I welcome other thoughts in comments.