The Rise of the Rest
At the end of the Cold War, international relations realists were on the defensive. Those who wrote about a return to a multipolar world of shifting alliances in Europe (John Mearsheimer) or suggested that NATO’s days were not numbered but its years were (Ken Waltz) seemed unable to accept that the world had changed in the early 1990s. With the United States perching benignly (that’s how it looked to Americans, anyway) atop the major global institutions and making the world safe for democracy, the liberals and constructivists began to dominate the discipline.
But now the popular media is full of stories of American decline, the rise of others (India, China, Europe, Russia), and renewed great power competition. Fareed Zakaria explains how we are in a “post-American world,” and Robert Kagan writes that history has returned as autocracies and democracies line up on opposite sides. According to a new survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 43% of Americans believe that the rise of China is a “critical threat” to U.S. interests (but for the time being still prefer a strategy of engagement). Perhaps we are finally “back to the future” as Mearsheimer put it nearly two decades ago? Will realism once again dominate IR as it did in the latter part of the Cold War?
No. Balancing just isn’t the main story of international politics as it was during much of the 20th century. Yes, the Chinese and Russians trumpet the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and U.S. officials fret about the Beijing-Moscow axis at the United Nations. But there’s no alliance that can counter NATO, and the United States has shown that when it perceives a necessity to act, it will do so with or without U.N. authorization. (It’s not just George Bush – Clinton bypassed the UN in 1999 to bomb Serbia.)
Even with an overstretched military and the subprime mortgage crisis, the United States remains the world’s dominant military, economic and even diplomatic power. And despite all the successes in Europe and China and the extraordinary unpopularity at home and abroad of the current administration, America still possesses more soft power than anyone else. Even so, as Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steve Weber deftly argued in the National Interest, much of what is going on in the world simply bypasses the West, but that doesn’t mean we’re talking about balancing, at least in the traditional sense of IR theory.
Unfortunately for liberal institutionalists, others have to buy into their conceptions of global governance for their arguments to work, just as constructivists have the most to say when a consensus around a particular international norm develops. We are seeing a breakdown in those kinds of consensus (and institutions) at the same time that America has lost so much of its legitimacy as a global leader. Perhaps it is time for a new theoretical tradition?
Comments
I suggest that, as a starting point, we should look to Richard Haass’ vision of a post cold war America.
If I remember correctly, he suggested that America would need to be a ‘reluctant sheriff.’ This would mean that we would need to act with interested coalitions, or ‘posses,’ to tackle international problems. There would be no need for a static international body; as the issues change, so would the coalitions. This would avoid much of the gridlock and hassle created by international organizations. Rather, the ability to reach relatively quick bilateral or multi-lateral agreements on certain international issues would result in quick and topic specific actions.
The UN’s response to Darfur, China’s human rights problem, or Iran’s nuclear development constantly faces the threat of a veto from one of the five countries. On any given issue, three or four countries agree on a certain response, but heal dragging by the opponents bog the process down. If Russia or China doesn’t want to sanction Iran, they should be excluded from the coalition… at least until they come around.
Rather than propping up an ineffective institution, perhaps we should be coalition-building outside of the UN and start responding quickly to international crises.
The sheriff assembles the posse, and leads it… and if the problem is big enough, he can go it alone, but at a great cost. Haass recognized this, and I think America now does too with Iraq. But American leadership is necessary because, Goldgeier says, we are still a giant that is able to project power and diplomacy.
Tying up one country’s leadership by placing all of our stock in one or two international organizations will continue to weaken our clout, and restrict our ability to assemble outside coalitions.
Posted by: Matt | August 4, 2008 07:33 PM
I’m not sure this this article betrays a slight simplification of the theoretical point of realism that also dominates much of the discussion about it (and why one could argue it was flawed both during AND after the Cold War). The point of realism is not just that it’s about the need for ‘balance’. It’s about how the international ‘struture’ constrains (and influences) the actions of states, and therefore how the nature of this structure places the projection (and protection) of power as central to a states interest. Of course in a bi-polar world one could therefore argue that ‘balance’ is a favorable approach to international politics (though I’d argue Kissinger was being disingenuous when he did this), but it is also possible to argue that structure is still just as important in a multi-polar or unipolar world (hence, neo-realism).
However, wondering about a new theory is problematical when it wasn’t just the removal of the bi-polar world that challenged realism. Realism was criticised because of its epistemological and ontolgical foundations. These criticisms (I think Steve Smith got this about right) allow us to wonder about the utility of realism during the Cold War and not just after it. The point being that some theoretical criticisims of realism mean that one could question the whole idea of seeking a ‘new’ theoretical tradition as missing the point because you don’t actually need (nor should desire) an overarching ‘perscriptive’ theory of International Relations. I guess constructivists would argue they managed that, though I’d say there are wrong to think they did (another story!).
Posted by: JR | August 5, 2008 09:23 AM
Realism is emphatically not reducible to balance-of-power theory. The fact that Professor Goldgeiger’s post derives most of its analytic frame from hegemonic-order theory should make that abundantly clear.
Posted by: Daniel Nexon | August 5, 2008 03:21 PM