Theory, Politics and the League of Democracies
In 1991-92, political science theory, campaign politics and global trends converged, and Bill Clinton’s foreign policy team stressed the importance of democracy when discussing America’s attitudes toward other countries. It was a way to differentiate the Arkansas governor from incumbent George H.W. Bush, who was charged with being too soft on China and too cozy with Gorbachev. It’s rare that theory gets so ingrained in policy conversations. (Other examples include balance of power, which had more play in the 1970s than the 1990s, and bureaucratic politics, which, although dismissed by many academics, is taken as a given by most of official Washington.) But Democratic Peace theory was all the rage in the Clinton years.
Since a signature foreign policy theme of Senator John McCain’s is the creation of a League of Democracies, and since that idea is one that has been supported by top Obama advisers such as Anthony Lake, it’s worth thinking back on the theory/politics/global trends convergence in 1992 regarding democracy promotion compared with the theory, politics and global trends behind creating a league of democracies.
In 1991-92, democracy was flourishing – communism had collapsed, and states throughout Central and Eastern Europe were rushing to join the West. It was a no-brainer to accept that regime change mattered – former enemies now wanted to be allies. Russia looked like it was on a democratic track. Citizens in places like Mongolia and Namibia were braving long distances to polling places (and extreme weather when they arrived and stood in line for hours), showing that an enthusiasm for democracy wasn’t limited to Western culture (where people likely wouldn’t brave either the long distances or the extreme weather).
Not only was democracy flourishing, so was Democratic Peace theory. So it made sense that promoting democracy would become part of the policy mainstream. But there’s another reason democracy promotion became central to the policy ideas articulated by the Clinton campaign and then the administration that followed. As Derek Chollet and I argue in our book, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11, Clinton’s advisers believed an emphasis on democracy promotion could be a political winner. The goal was to bring back to the Democratic fold the neo-conservatives (yes, those neo-conservatives) who had left the party in the 1970s and 1980s and had supported Republicans for president in 1980, ’84 and ’88. The neo-conservatives were unhappy that George H.W. Bush wasn’t Ronald Reagan, and a number of prominent members of that community ended up endorsing Clinton. So, with theory to buttress the idea, a political rationale for pushing it, and a seeming rush by former authoritarian regimes to join the democratic fold, Clinton in his foreign policy speeches during the campaign – a campaign that admittedly wasn’t about foreign policy – made sure to highlight the need to do more than George H.W. Bush to help fledgling democracies. Clinton’s 1994 National Security Strategy (much less noticed than George W. Bush’s 2002 call for a “balance of power in favor of freedom) emphasized a strategy of democratic engagement and enlargement.
Well, here we are in 2008. McCain says we should have a league of democracies. So do leading Democratic foreign policy experts such as Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay. “Democracies,” they wrote in the American Interest awhile back, “share the most important value of all—a common dedication to ensuring the life, liberty and happiness of free peoples. And democracies constitute the world’s most capable states in terms of military potential, economic capability and political weight. A Concert that brings the established democracies together into a single institution will be best able to meet the many challenges that beset the new age of global politics.”
Daalder and Lindsay make a powerful case. And thanks to McCain’s support for the idea, the most recent issues of key policy journals (e.g., Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy and World Affairs) all have at least one article asking whether or not the idea makes sense. Having argued in Foreign Affairs two years ago with Daalder that we need to include non-European democracies in NATO, I’m sympathetic to the notion of a more general effort to organize the democracies.
Those who supported the war in Kosovo know that Clinton could never have gotten U.N. Security Council authorization for that effort and thus went through NATO, which at the time the war started had just grown to an organization of nineteen democratic countries. More recently, seeing Russia and China veto the U.N. effort to sanction Mugabe reminds us once again of the problem that the major autocracies can pose.
But South Africa also voted against sanctions against the rulers of Zimbabwe. And that raises a theoretical question: would “a common dedication to ensuring the life, liberty and happiness of free peoples” lead to a convergence of foreign policy preferences among states in league? Much academic literature has been devoted to studying whether established democracies don’t go to war with one another because of their political systems. We don’t have the same body of literature that can speak to the notion of the foreign policy actions that a league of democracies might take.
Nor do we have either the global trends or the political imperatives. The United States has lost both legitimacy and relative power since the early 1990s; Russia isn’t democratic, and it doesn’t look like democracy is sweeping the Middle East. It’s not even clear that any major democracies would answer McCain’s call to form a league – and there’s not going to be a league if no one wants to join. But there is also a lack of political payoff. McCain has had the support of the neo-conservatives ever since he backed the Kosovo war in 1999, and they certainly like hearing his charge for the league. But how much does that really get him? Clinton needed to find a few issues that he could use to attack an experienced foreign policy president. In the early 1990s, IR theory, global trends and political calculations by the New Democrats all pointed in one direction when it came to discussions about democracy. That doesn’t seem to be the case in 2008.
Comments
How much of this is tied in to battle fatigue? Are Americans returning to their natural preference for isolationism and protectionism, a la pre-WWII? It can be hard for McCain (Obama for that matter, too) to get much support for any sort of League if Americans, as a whole, prefer retrenchment. But, I’m not an IR scholar, but retrenchment seems to be the mood, but I concede I don’t have evidence to support that impression.
Posted by: Black Political Analysis | July 30, 2008 01:28 PM
This is a very interesting post and I agree that the question of whether or not a “common dedication to ensuring the life, liberty and happiness of free peoples [would] lead to a convergence of foreign policy preferences among states in league” is of fundamental importance when considering this issue. I think (unfortunately) history cannot provide us with a clear answer to this question. In many cases, simply being a “democracy” has not necessarily generated common policy preferences between states, as state interests have trumped convergence. While not the only examples, I would point to the initial U.S. resistance to fight in WWII as a potentially good one and the French and German resistance to invade Iraq as a more recent one. Of course, there are examples on the other side too. While this complicates the question, it does not undermine its importance. Maybe it would be helpful if we can revise the question. Perhaps we should ask: Under what conditions and on what issues do democratic governments develop convergent foreign policy preferences? Of course even this question doesn’t quite remove us from the larger (and more interesting) debate about where policy preferences come from (or if it even matters that we know where preferences come from given that structure may force policy conformity anyway)…
While the question of where policy preferences come from (and if it matters that we answer that question) leads us down a bit of a rabbit hole and into the exciting world of IR theory, there are other questions about this league that are also important (albeit perhaps a bit simplistic). I should say that I am not well versed on McCain’s exact position on this “league,” so forgive me if I make any points he has already addressed. With that disclaimer, here are my questions for supporters of this league: Obviously, I have to first ask whether or not the participants will be required to wear superhero costumes or if that will be optional. Beyond that critical question, how would this league define “democracy?” What standards of governance will determine whether a state is “democratic enough” to be a member? Moreover, who will determine those standards and monitor states to ensure compliance? The U.S.? Or, will another country get to decide if we are democratic enough to be in the league? Next, what will be the institutional design of this league? Specifically, by what decision-making mechanism would this league arrive at policy positions—and, more importantly, would it have to use non-democratic means to make decisions? Would those countries that are “most democratic” and have significantly more resources than others (ie the U.S.) have a greater say in policy decisions? Would they have veto power? If so, how would this kind of hypocrisy impact the league and how others perceive it? If the decision-making process is fully democratic, what kind of costs might the U.S. be asked to bear by other democracies that are not necessarily in our immediate interest—and are those costs worth it? Furthermore, those who would desire such a league must be making the assumption that this league would be a more efficient actor than other formats—it might be prudent to question this assumption. Moreover, what tools would this league use to achieve its goals? Would military force be on the table? If so, would the league create its own army or would it simply rely on countries to “donate” forces when necessary? Likewise if financial rewards/carrots are going to be used, who will provide the money? I have a feeling that given the current U.S. economic problems, U.S. taxpayers are might not be too excited about giving up what they have left in their bank accounts to fund the adventures of this “league.” The question of resources of course also brings up a bevy of potential collective action problems and the risk the U.S. runs of becoming the sucker left holding the bag (let’s not forget all the help we have received from democracies around the world for Iraq’s reconstruction). Also, what is the opportunity cost of creating this league? Seems to me that we have some other rather pressing challenges that require our valuable (and limited) time and resources. Furthermore, assuming this league is formed, it would clearly need to provide its members with some sort of incentive for joining. What would that incentive be? In addition, this raises another very important question: how will those left out of the party react? Will they just sit by and feel sorry for themselves; will they hustle to become more democratic (which could in turn trigger intrastate conflicts for power and separatist movements); or—in what could potentially be a very disturbing event—will they form their own counter-league of non-democracies? Some IR scholars might argue that those left out of the party (and certainly those threatened by the party) would indeed form a league of their own—and one reserved not just for playing baseball. So, now the questions get interesting (and perhaps a bit abstract so I’ll keep it short). What would happen if a counter-league were to form? Would we enter into a new bipolar world order—the league of democracies vs. the counter-league? Would such an order usher in a new Cold War? Or, would we find that by institutionalizing division on a global scale, we have ruined our chances for cooperation, communication and hurried ourselves not to the next Cold War but to the next world war? Did I go too far….perhaps.
Beyond all these questions about the specifics of the league, I have one more point. Clearly, there are problems that the UN (and other international institutions) have not been able to properly address—and that (I believe) is unacceptable. But to think that by creating a “league of democracies” the obstacles to properly addressing those problems will disappear (or be more easily overcome) is just simply bizarre (no serious disrespect intended to some of the very intelligent people behind this idea). Just because China and Russia are not actually seated at the “league’s” decision-making table that certainly doesn’t mean that their interests are not going to be part of the decision-making process in some way. In other words, to think that just by denying countries like China and Russia a vote on policy decisions that they will not find other avenues to ensure their interests are respected seems pretty naïve (even to a graduate student). China and Russia and not just going to roll over and say, “well this is what the league of democracies decided to do, so even though we don’t want them to do it, we have to respect their decision.” I suppose that there is a chance this could happen, but that is a pretty risky gamble and, quite frankly, a rather aggressive and confrontational approach (which could have serious consequences). My last question is therefore: would we rather fight it out with China and Russia in the Security Council (or some revised form of the Security Council) or are we willing to risk fighting it out in some unknown arena at some unknown—and potentially higher—cost?
Posted by: christina | July 31, 2008 11:41 PM