Reassessing the Reassessment of the Logic of Suicide Terrorism
In a post several weeks ago, I summarized a critique of Robert Pape’s work on suicide terrorism. The critique is now published in the American Political Science Review (here, gated). Pape wrote a response to this critique (here, gated), which it is only fair for me to summarize. Here are some key points:
A number of years ago, I published “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” (Pape 2003) an article advancing the hypothesis that suicide terrorism is mainly the product of foreign military occupation or, at least, the terrorists’ perception that territory they prize is under occupation, for example, Al Qaeda’s conviction that governments on the Arabian peninsula represent an American occupation regime. It is not, as the conventional wisdom holds, mostly a product of religious extremism independent of political circumstances. I showed that this hypothesis accounted for 95% of all of the 188 suicide terrorist attacks that occurred worldwide from 1980 to 2001. The article discussed differences between circumstances under which suicide terrorism has occurred and circumstances when it has not, but did not include an explicit effort to measure causal effects of factors influencing the difference. Based on the contents of their letter, Ashworth et al. (2008) seem to have stopped following the literature at this point.
Several years later, I published Dying To Win (2005), which expanded and updated my previous analysis. This book not only adds more data on the global patterns of suicide terrorism through the end of 2003, but also, most important for our discussion here, the book tests the main hypotheses against all of the other causal factors that are prominent in the literature across several domains relying on methods that include variation between cases of suicide terrorism and cases when it did not occur.
Pape then quotes at length from Dying To Win.
Comments
Many have attempted to define terrorism and to explain its causes. I have researched this question extensively; and there can be no doubt that suicide terrorism is the asymetrical response to actual or perceived foreign occupation of cherished soil. The real question, is what to do about it.
Richard Jackson argues that the Bush administration’s approach to terrorism as actually perpetuating the violence rather than stemming it; and mirroring the terrorists tactics more than countering them. Jackson contends that clearly a more sophisticated approach is needed:
By failing to understand the history and context of terrorism, the actual nature and cause of terrorism, and the real motivations and aims of the terrorists (who are most certainly not sacrificing their lives in suicidal attacks simply for the sake of “evil”), we may seriously damage the search for more effective and long-term policy solutions (Jackson, 2005:166).
Rohan Gunaratna (2006:134) agrees:
Because of perceived injustices attributed to the West in general, particularly in Pakistan and Iraq, there will be significant support for the new generation of mujahideen in Iraq. Groups that were dying are making a comeback, and several new groups have emerged in Iraq, Indonesia, Pakistan, and even in Europe.
Audrey Kurth Cronin (2006:67) also agrees:
The current wave of international terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented threats from non-state actors, not only is a reaction to globalization but is facilitated by it; the U.S. response to this reality has been reactive and anachronistic… There has been little creative thinking, however, about how to confront the growing terrorist backlash that has been unleashed.
The main thrust of Lefebvre and Farley’s (2007:644) recent article is that while terrorism presents a grave challenge to the West, many of our present counter terrorism measures (particularly torture) threatens the very fabric of Western civilization. The authors conclude that an ethical system that allows for torture would “nourish terrorism.” The United States has no viable options but to find a more sophisticated approach to terrorism. “Enthusiasm for martyrdom persists as long as there is a reasonable chance that it will lead to victory. Sacrifice must have a purpose” (Laqueur, 2003:97). Given that enthusiasm for suicide attacks does not appear to be waning, but has in fact “become part of the popular culture” one can surmise that terrorist organizations must still have reason to believe that suicide attacks are a successful means to a victorious end (Stern, 2003:53) . According to FBI Director Robert Mueller, “future suicide attacks on US soil” are “inevitable.” Regardless how much President Bush (2001a) assures us that “we will prevail,” we are far too vulnerable to win in a game of chicken with terrorists. As a statement issued by Qa’idat al-Jihad remarks: “We are really puzzled to see Americans and their followers in the Western world think that they are able to confront people who wish to die more than they [the Americans] want to live” (Paz, 2003:2).
Posted by: John Maszka | July 7, 2008 03:28 PM