The New Hampshire Polls, One More Time
[With apologies for spending so much time in the weeds on this issue…]
In this piece, Andrew Kohut of the Pew Center gives his thoughts about why the NH polls got Hillary’s vote share wrong. Here, I think, is the crux of his argument:
Poorer, less well-educated white people refuse surveys more often than affluent, better-educated whites. Polls generally adjust their samples for this tendency. But here’s the problem: these whites who do not respond to surveys tend to have more unfavorable views of blacks than respondents who do the interviews.
I find this curious, because the Pew Center itself has done some excellent studies of the consequences for survey non-response for attitudes, and their findings suggest little difference between people who answer surveys and those who don’t. Here is the most recent report. (See also this scholarly publication based on the study.)
In this study, they conducted two polls, one “standard” poll that was in the field for 5 days (as per usual) and one “rigorous” poll that stayed in the field for 21 weeks. The former had a response rate of 25% and a cooperation rate of 34%; the latter had rates of 50% and 58%. The authors compare attitudes across the two polls, and then across a subsample of the rigorous poll that they call the “hardest to reach” (defined as “respondents refused the interview at least twice before complying and/or required 21 or more calls to complete”).
The key finding that bears on the NH polls is that there was very little difference in racial attitudes across the standard poll, the rigorous poll, and the hardest-to-reach. See the table entitled “Values and Attitudes” on this page.
Now, obviously this study is based on national samples, not NH samples. But Kohut’s explanation seems to entail an relatively unlikely series of events:
1) Non-respondents in the NH polls have significantly less positive affect towards blacks relative to respondents. In other words, the basic finding of the Pew study did not hold in this case.
2) A significant number of these non-respondents both voted and voted in the Democratic presidential primary. Even though the kinds of people who are less likely to answer surveys tend not to vote. Even though the kinds of people who vote in Democratic primaries tend not to have unfavorable attitudes toward blacks. (Of course, there are people who will vote but not answer surveys. And there are people who vote Democratic but have racial prejudices. I’m merely describing patterns of association here.) Moreover, there had to be a substantial number of these voting non-respondents to give Clinton 8 points more than she was anticipated to get.
3) Those voters were motivated to vote for Clinton, consciously or not, by their racial attitudes, rather than by other factors.
So I’m not convinced.
Interestingly, there is now at least one comparison of a pre-election poll to the exit poll, and this comparison shows significant movement to Clinton among women, but much less so among men — see Jon Cohen, pollster at the Washington Post, here. This suggests that perhaps there was a late trend, one that you cannot pick up by simply using the “when did you make your decision” question (as Kohut does in his op-ed, but Cohen suggests is problematic in his post).
So, there is still much to be learned. The American Association for Public Opinion Research has called on pollsters to release their NH data.
[Update: More from Mark Blumenthal. See also John Judis, who is skeptical of Kohut and has some data to back this up.]
Comments
Interesting post, John.
Here's something for you to chew on, feel free to post it to the front page if you think it's deserving:
There are very good reasons for why a highly compressed primary schedule may not winnow the candidates as quickly as everyone expected it to.
It's because winnowing requires momentum, and building momentum requires time, days and weeks to drag out, between contests. People need time to process information so as to vote in sophisticated, (e.g., voting for a second or third favorite candidate); vs. sincere ( e.g., voting for their first preference) fashion.
What this new schedule has done is allowed each of the top 3-4 candidates to now focus on their own distinct pocket of electoral support: SC, FL, MI, NV, etc.
So, for example, on the GOP side, Huckabee goes for SC, Giuliani hopes to take FL, Romney wants a win in Michigan, and so forth. Romney and Giuliani, in particular, are only a token presence in the other states.
This development, oddly enough, could delay winnowing, not speed up the winnowing process like so many expected it to. That's because without time for momentum to build, and sophisticated voting to kick-in, voters cast ballots according to their sincere (first) preferences, and each of the top 3 or 4 candidates each take a state, or two, and claim to be on their way to the nomination.
So suppose Giuliani takes FL, Huckabee takes SC, Romney takes Mich, perhaps. McCain is still in. Still no frontrunner.
Now tell me that ISN'T what is happening this year in the GOP? If so, it could be awhile before we see the nominee. Ironically, it might have been a faster route to the nomination under the former, non-compressed, system.
Yes?
Now let's see how long it takes for political scientists to figure this out and actually start writing about it. No doubt it will take years, decades perhaps!
;-)
Jim Gimpel
Posted by: Jim Gimpel | January 11, 2008 06:48 PM
I think it's important for the pollsters to release all of their cross-tabs for NH to really get down to understanding this. My suspicion is that their likely voter models were inadequate given something specific to this particular contest.
Eric
Posted by: Eric | January 11, 2008 11:50 PM
I saw somewhere that one polling company learned that 18% of their respondents made their decision on election day. They had never seen that.
A long time ago, George Grayson at William and Mary made me read a stack of public opinion behavior books because I never paid attention to that stuff. Well, I think I remember that voters often make their final decision inside the voting booth and choose to reinforce what they did in previous elections.
Could that be relevant, and George Grayson did a good thing?
Bob Spencer
Posted by: Bob Spencer | January 12, 2008 07:13 PM
Kohut's explanation relies on another (untenable) assumption -- that poorer, less well-educated white people (who Kohut says have less favorable attitudes about blacks) *did not* refuse to complete the Iowa pre-election surveys to the same extent that they refused to complete the NH pre-election surveys.
In other words, Kohut's explanation, which relies on an assumption about non-response bias, cannot explain both why the NH polls "got it wrong" and why the Iowa polls "got it right" so to speak.
Posted by: Joanne Miller | January 15, 2008 03:23 PM